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I. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN U.S. LAW
There is a nexus between the abolition or the diminution of [the precepts of Ameri-
can slavery jurisprudence] as advocated by the slavemasters in power in the Ameri-
can colonial and antebellum periods and the efforts in this decade to advocate uni-
versal human rights for all. The more we appreciate the extraordinary injustice of
the original precepts, the more persistent we will be in eradicating the vestiges of
those 3recepts in the United States and the equivalent denigration throughout the
world.
Nelson Mandela reminded a joint session of the United States Congress in
1990 that "[tlo deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very
humanity. ' 2 Human rights law is a subset of international law designed to pro-
t Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I'm grateful to the Yale Black Law
Students Association for organizing this symposium and to the editors of the Yale Law and Policy Re-
view. My thanks to Kathleen Cleaver, Andrea Curcio, Brian Nichols, and Sharon Venne for thoughtful
suggestions, and particularly to Ward Churchill for insights into the plenary power doctrine and for the
inspiration to do this work.
1. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 206 (1996).
2. Id. at 205.
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tect certain fundamental rights of individuals and of ethnic, religious, racial,
and national minorities within states. It also encompasses the rights of peoples
to self-determination. 3 Since World War II the major world powers have ac-
knowledged that these universal principles of human rights must be accepted as
binding on all states, because the domestic laws that protect the rights of "in-
siders" often fail to protect those regarded as "Other" within the polity.4 The
colonial legacy of the arbitrary imposition of state boundaries upon indigenous
nations in almost every part of the world makes international human rights law
particularly important .
The United States portrays itself as a nation of laws,6 laws that give optimal
protection to human rights and democratic processes, laws that apply equally to
all "citizens" and "fairly" to all others within its jurisdiction. However, its in-
ternational reputation is that of a state reluctant to ratify human rights agree-
ments and unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of international decision-making
bodies.7 The United States typically responds that it does not need to bind itself
to international human rights instruments because it has a legal system that
provides not only full justice but more protection than international law. In fact,
it urges other states to accept U.S. law as the model for universally applicable
international law and legal structures.
8
3. See infra text accompanying notes 273-280.
4. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
than States, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) ("[I]t is well known that the legal enforcement system is
less effective against those who are powerful than ... those who are poor and weak."). On the "Other,"
see HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 66-84 (1994); TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST
OF AMERICA: THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER 3-5 (Richard Howard trans., Harper & Row 1987).
5. Bernard Neitschmann, The Fourth World: Nations Versus States, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 225-242 (George J. Demko & William
B. Wood eds., 1994); see also Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-
Determination: The Meaning ofInternational Law, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1477 (2001) (arguing for
recognition of the sovereignty of nations as well as states). See generally HUGH SETON-WATSON,
NATIONS AND STATES: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM
(1977) (distinguishing nations and states, both historically and politically).
"Nation" as used here refers to "the geographically bounded territory of a common people as well as
to the people themselves. A nation is a cultural territory made up of communities of individuals who see
themselves as 'one people' on the basis of common ancestry, history, society, institutions, ideology,
language, territory, and, often, religion." Nietschmann, supra, at 226.
Despite the common conflation of the terms, a nation is distinct from a state, which Nietchmann de-
fines as "a centralized political system within international legal boundaries recognized by other states.
Further, it uses a civilian-military bureaucracy to establish one government and to enforce one set of
institutions and laws.... This system is imposed on many preexisting nations and peoples." Id. at 227.
6. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
7. See M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: US Evasion of the Spirit of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357 (1994); Johan D. van der
Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-
Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775 (2001).
8. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 65-80 (1990). See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratifi-
cation of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995)
(noting the damaging effect of U.S. reservations to multilateral treaties); Elizabeth A. Reimels, Com-
ment, Playing for Keeps: The United States Interpretation of International Prohibitions Against the
Juvenile Death Penalty-The U.S. Wants to Play the International Human Rights Game, But Only If It
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It is generally assumed that the protections, procedural and substantive, of-
fered under U.S. law are those embodied in the Constitution and the body of
statutory and judicial law that has emerged under its aegis. Whether the U.S.
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, adequately protects those universal
human rights acknowledged in international law has generated significant de-
bate. 9 There is, however, a larger problem with the United States's assertion
that the rights protected under international law are adequately protected by its
domestic law, because a large sector of persons and groups under U.S. juris-
diction, and therefore governed by U.S. law, are excluded from most or all of
the protections of the Constitution by virtue of what is called the "plenary
power" doctrine.
"Plenary" means full, or complete, and application of the doctrine means
that U.S. courts, rather than assessing the constitutionality of governmental ac-
tion, defer to the "political" branches of government, Congress and the execu-
tive. 10 The plenary power doctrine is used primarily with respect to those
groups recognized in international law to be most vulnerable: those over whom
the government exercises complete power, but who are deemed by that same
government to be "outsiders." Thus, the plenary power doctrine, though rarely
discussed in general constitutional jurisprudence, is core U.S. law relating to
American Indian nations," immigrants, 12 and colonized territories such as
Puerto Rico and Guam.1
3
Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 303 (2001) (noting importance of U.S. compliance with hu-
man rights treaties and problems arising out of failure to enforce international law in domestic courts).
9. Questions are raised, for example, over the U.S. practice, deemed constitutional, of executing
juveniles and the mentally retarded. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RIGHTS FOR ALL 112-15 (1998).
10. In her thorough analysis of plenary power in "federal Indian law," Newton explains that the
term has been used to mean (1) exclusive power, (2) power capable of preempting state law, and (3)
unlimited power, with respect to Indians. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 n.3 (1984). See also DAVID E. WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 25-27
(1997) (describing the origins of the term in the context of Indian law); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immi-
gration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255; Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
11. It is important to note that use of the term "tribe" is problematic both because of its association
with animal groupings and "primitive or nomadic peoples," see, e.g., WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1949 (2d ed. 1983), and because it has been used to obfuscate the fact that Indian peoples
comprise nations.
12. I am using the term "immigrants" in its general sense to mean non-U.S. citizens coming to the
U.S., not as it is used in immigration law to refer specifically to those non-citizens who have been
granted lawful permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15) (1994). Most of the cases refer-
encing the plenary power doctrine deal with the law governing admission and expulsion of non-citizens.
While this is somewhat different than the law governing the rights and obligations of non-citizens re-
siding in the United States, that law is also undergirded by the plenary power doctrine. See infra text
accompanying notes 121-148.
13. These territories currently include Puerto Rico, the Northern Marianas, "American" Samoa and
the "U.S." Virgin Islands. Despite U.S. assertions that these territories are "freely associated" with the
United States, they are commonly recognized as colonies. See infra text accompanying notes 175-190.
Hawai'i is also a directly colonized territory, but its forced "incorporation" into the United States has
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A cursory look at the common roots, functioning, and purposes of the doc-
trine in U.S. immigration, Indian, and colonial law reveals significant human
rights problems. Thus, "plenary power" is the legal rationale for allowing the
federal government to turn Indian reservations into radioactive wastelands
while simultaneously robbing indigenous peoples of billions of dollars of roy-
alties from their oil, gas, and other natural resources; 14 the interception of Hai-
tian refugees on the high seas and the indefinite imprisonment of Mariel Cu-
bans, and now many Muslims and Arab Americans, not accused of any crime;
15
and the refusal to hold a binding referendum on Puerto Rico's future and the
continued bombing of the island of Vieques.16
Nothing in the Constitution explicitly gives the government such power.
Explanations and justifications of the exercise of plenary power are confused
and sometimes contradictory, but they boil down to the notion that it is an ex-
traconstitutional power, inherent in sovereignty, which the United States gov-
ernment acquired upon becoming a recognized state. 17 Thus, the theory goes,
the government's powers are limited by the Constitution with respect to do-
mestic policy-its relations with its political subdivisions and its citizens-but
unlimited in its dealings with outsiders or its control over its domestic popula-
tion in the context of defending against outside threats.1
8
Are there no limits on the exercise of this power? Justifications for the
doctrine invoke the need to deal effectively with other sovereigns, so one
would suppose that its exercise would be limited by the response of those other
sovereigns and, presumably, by the international law that governs relations
between sovereigns. But, in fact, plenary power is used with respect to those
Others over whom the United States exercises essentially complete control, in
situations in which the United States neither respects their sovereignty nor ex-
situated it somewhat differently with respect to the plenary power doctrine and I do not attempt to in-
corporate it into this overview. See generally ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY: THE RECORD OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS HAWAIIANS (Sharon Venne & Ward Chur-
chill eds., forthcoming 2002), at http://www.southendpress.org; Michael Caroll, Every Man Has a
Right to Decide His Own Destiny: The Development of Native Hawiian Self-Determination, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 639 (2000); John M. Van Dyke et al., Self-Determination for Nonself-Governing
Peoples and Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawai 'i, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623 (1996).
It is also a significant doctrine in U.S. military law, a subject beyond the scope of this Article, but
one where I suspect we would find similar dynamics at work. See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733 (1974) (holding that an officer's statements urging black enlisted men to refuse to obey orders to go
to Vietnam was unprotected speech); Captain John A. Carr, USAF, Free Speech in the Military Com-
munity: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 4 A.F. L. REV. 303
(1998). One finds parallels, too, in the law governing the treatment of U.S. prisoners. See Ira Bloom,
Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judi-
cial Power, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 389 (1998) (criticizing expanded congressional powers under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 171-174.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 127-148.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 181-186.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44, 86-95, 114.
18. Id.
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tends the usual protections of domestic or international law.
The harsh consequences of the plenary power doctrine are generally ig-
nored or dismissed as aberrations, 19 perhaps because-like the law of slavery-
20it is exercised over relatively powerless Others. Examination of the plenary
power doctrine as a whole, however, reveals that it is not an exception to a gen-
eral rule of conformity to human rights law, but a systematic denial of both
domestic and international protections to those who most need them. Expand-
21ing on Oliver Wendell Holmes's observation that the law is a seamless web,
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. illustrated that American jurisprudence, past
and present, can only be fully understood by incorporating the precepts of the
law of slavery. Race-related law, he said, cannot be dismissed as aberrational
without misconstruing the fundamental nature of American law and society.
22
This approach can be usefully extended to the law governing those not explic-
itly enslaved, but subjugated as Other under U.S. law-the people in external
colonies, those subject to internal colonial rule,23 and those explicitly recog-
nized as subjects of another sovereign. A full understanding of American law
must incorporate the exercise of plenary power as well as the law that operates
within the framework of the Constitution.
19. In attempting to justify the United States's failure to honor its treaties with Indian Nations,
Chief Justice Marshall said that, "the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar
and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16
(1831) and this characterization has generally been accepted. See, eg., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 1-2 (1994). In his excellent
analysis of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law, Hiroshi Motomura notes that "[i]mmigration
law, as it has developed over the past one hundred years under the domination of the plenary power
doctrine, represents an aberrational form of the typical relationship between statutory interpretation and
constitutional law." Motomura, supra note 10, at 549. While I believe Motomura is using "aberration"
in a descriptive rather than normative way, the characterization of that which is extraconstitutional as
aberrational is common and tends to minimize the critical function played by the plenary power doc-
trine in American jurisprudence.
20. Even when the application of plenary power has been considered in the context of one field, it
has not been considered in this larger context. A May 2001 Westlaw search revealed that of the ap-
proximately 500 law review articles referencing plenary power and both immigration and Indian law,
none did a comparative analysis. However, for a forthcoming analysis encompassing these subjects, see
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (forthcoming 2002).
21. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 199.
22. See generally id; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts ofAmerican Slavery Jurispru-
dence: Chief Justice Roger Taney's Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall's Condemnation of the
Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695 (1996); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Violence
in America: "Contracts," Myths and History, 36 B.C. L. REV. 899 (1995); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,
Fundamental Rights and the Constitution: A Heavenly Discourse, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 289 (John H. Franklin & Genna R. McNeil
eds., 1995).
23. By "colonial" I generally mean a relationship in which one nation is subordinated by another
for economic, political or strategic gain. See text accompanying note 286 infra for additional indices of
colonial status. While territories such as Puerto Rico or Guam are generally recognized as colonies de-
spite U.S. claims to the contrary, the reality of Indian nations and Hawai'i as U.S. colonies has been
obfuscated by the notion that colonies must be outside the territorial boundaries claimed by a state. See
infra text accompanying note 291.
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Excellent, in-depth critiques of the plenary power doctrine exist in each of
the fields of law I discuss in this Article. My purpose here is to give an over-
view-undoubtedly oversimplifying many specific applications of the doc-
trine-to help us see in broad strokes its significance in the functioning of
American law as a whole. Part II looks at the origins of the plenary power doc-
trine in the Supreme Court cases dealing with American Indian nations, immi-
grants, and overseas territories in the late 1800s, when the United States had
consolidated itself as a settler state on the North American continent and was
considering imperialist expansion overseas. Part Ill examines how the doctrine
continues to justify judicial deference to essentially unfettered congressional
and executive control over the lives of those subject to plenary power, and the
destructive consequences of such deference.
The solution to the human rights problems created by the exercise of ple-
nary power is often presumed to be the extension of full constitutional protec-
tions to the subject groups; in other words, the assimilation of the Other into the
mainstream of the body politic. The legal system nominally took this route with
respect to African Americans, over whom complete plenary power was
authorized by law until the Reconstruction amendments. However, as Judge
Higginbotham and many other scholars have documented, formal legal equality
has not for the most part resulted in the actual protection of African-American
human rights. In addition, assimilationist solutions aggravate violations of peo-
ples' rights to self-determination. Part IV considers these issues and suggests
that a "civil rights" or intraconstitutional resolution is inadequate to protect
those currently subject to plenary power.
Part V argues that international law provides a viable solution to these
problems. The Constitution explicitly recognizes treaties as part of the "su-
preme law of the land, ' 24 and many scholars have put forth compelling argu-
ments for why, within a constitutional framework, international law should be
fully recognized and enforced by domestic courts. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has developed a jurisprudence that explicitly allows domestic law and
25policy to violate international law without finding it to be unconstitutional.
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land"); see also The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.").
25. This includes judicially developed doctrines such as the "last in time" rule under which courts
will enforce a later-enacted federal statute even where it conflicts with a treaty, see Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); the "self executing treaty" doctrine under which some treaties will not be
enforced without implementing legislation, see Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); the "po-
litical question" doctrine justifying judicial deference to actions of the executive or legislative branches
of the government, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); and the "act of state" doctrine under which
courts refrain from judging the actions of other sovereignties, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
These judicially created doctrines prevent U.S. courts from being a forum in which violations of
Vol. 20:427, 2002
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Because the Court has explicitly found the peoples affected by the plenary
power doctrine to be outside the protection of the Constitution, although clearly
under the jurisdiction of the United States, their only effective legal protection
lies in the enforcement of international law. Part VI concludes by advocating a
"metaconstitutional" approach which acknowledges that American jurispru-
dence does, in fact, extend beyond the Constitution and provides for the incor-
poration and enforcement of universal principles of international law.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE: THE 19TH CENTURY CASES
It would mean that the United States may acquire territory by cession, conqiest or
treaty, and that Congress may exercise sovereign dominion over it, outside of and in
violation of the Constitution.... Thus will be engrafted upon our republican insti-
tutions.., a colonial system entirely foreign to the genius of our Government and
abhorrent to the principles that underlie and pervade the Constitution.... [W]e will
have two governments over the peoples subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, one existing under a written Constitution, creating a government with
authority to exercise only powers expressly granted... ; the other, existing outside
of the written Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten law to be declared fiom time to
time by Congress, which is itself only a creature of that instrument.
26
The U.S. Supreme Court initially articulated the doctrine allowing the "po-
litical" branches of government plenary power over immigrants, Indian nations,
and U.S. colonial "possessions" in a series of decisions announced between
1886 and 1903. By the late 1800s the United States had consolidated control
over the territory now identified as the forty-eight contiguous states. The U.S.
had taken the northern half of Mexico in 1848; 27 the Civil War had successfully
prevented southern secession and the sweeping social changes initiated during
28Reconstruction had been rolled back. By 1869 the east and west coasts were
connected by the transcontinental railroad and virtually all Indian land was in
settler hands as a result of the making and breaking of treaties, ongoing military
campaigns and the extermination of civilian populations. Howard Zinn reports
that in "[t]he year of the massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, it was officially de-
clared by the Bureau of the Census that the internal frontier was closed."'29
The powers of the state-legislative, executive and judicial-now turned to
two broad areas of concern: the place of those deemed Other within American
international law can effectively be redressed and thus violate the principle of customary international
law, articulated in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a "party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339.
26. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 239-40 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Efren
Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65
REV. JuR. U.P.R. 225, 318-19 (1996).
27. See RODOLFO ACU04A, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 5-133 (3d ed. 1988).
28. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 124-289 (1980).
29. Id. at 290. See generally DAVID SvALDI, SAND CREEK AND THE RHETORIC OF EXTERMINATION
(1989).
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society, and the extent to which the United States would follow the path of
European imperialism and continue to expand overseas. Between 1886 and
1903 the Supreme Court addressed these issues in seminal decisions regarding
immigrants, starting with the Chinese Exclusion Cases30 ; Indians, from United
States v. Kagama3 1 through Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock3 2; and colonial subjects, in
the Insular Cases beginning with Downes v. Bidwell.33 In addition to articulat-
ing the plenary power doctrine in these cases, the Supreme Court also decided
Plessy v. Ferguson,34 which will be considered in Part IV as part of the intra-
constitutional alternative to the plenary power doctrine.
A. Immigrants
As a sparsely populated and fairly weak settler state, for nearly a century
the United States encouraged immigration from northern and western Europe.
35
After occupation of what became the "lower forty-eight" states, tensions
emerged between those who wanted to encourage international trade and the
importation of cheap labor, especially after the abolition of slavery, and those
who wanted to protect "American" (i.e., "white") workers. In 1868, the United
States and China agreed in the Burlingame Treaty to expand trade and to guar-
antee unfettered migration, citing the "inherent and inalienable right of man to
change his home and allegiance, and.., the mutual advantage of free migra-
tion.' 36 However, after the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869,
leaving many Chinese unemployed, the country entered a depression and pres-
sure mounted on Congress to restrict immigration.37 In 1875, Congress passed
an act excluding "convicts and prostitutes," a restriction which could have been
race- and nationality-neutral but for the presumption that Chinese women were
prostitutes. 38 In 1882, Congress suspended the immigration of all Chinese
30. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
31. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
32. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
33. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. There was no federal regulation of immigration until 1875, but there were attempts by individ-
ual states to restrict immigration. See generally Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law
(1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993).
36. Burlingame Treaty, July 28, 1868, U.S.-P.R.C., 16 Stat. 739, T.S. No. 48; see also THOMAS A.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 180-81 (4th ed. 1998).
37. See SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY [SCIRP], U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, STAFF REPORT (1981), reprinted in ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 36 at 152, 158. See generally ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN
AMERICA, 1882-1943 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
38. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). The initial waves of Chinese immigration
consisted of men, recruited to work in the mines and on the railroads. By the 1870s, those who had sur-
vived were ready to send for wives and establish families. Given the anti-miscegenation laws and sen-
timents of the time, this restriction effectively consigned these men to permanent bachelor communities
and ensured that that generation of Chinese, at least, would not reproduce itself in America. See
RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 121-27
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workers for ten years,39 and in 1884, it required all Chinese residents leaving
the United States to obtain certificates of re-entry.
Chae Chan Ping, who had lived in the United States for twelve years, ob-
tained such a certificate and went to China to visit his family. In 1888, just be-
fore his return, Congress enacted legislation precluding the entry of all Chinese
laborers, regardless of whether they held certificates. Chae Chan Ping chal-
lenged the 1888 law as a violation of the Burlingame Treaty and a violation of
40due process. Writing for the Court, Justice Field noted that the statute con-
flicted with the treaty but would nonetheless be enforced under the "last in
time" rule.4 1 Addressing the constitutional question, Field said that Congress
had the power to regulate immigration, a power not explicitly referenced in the
Constitution, and that the courts would not intervene because that power ema-
nated from the government's prerogatives over national security, territorial sov-
ereignty, and self-preservation. Reflecting the common perception of immi-
grants as Other, Justice Field noted that if Congress "considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to
be dangerous to its peace and security... its determination is conclusive upon
the judiciary. ', 2
Three years later the Court upheld an immigration officer's exclusion of a
Japanese woman, Nishimura Ekiu, without a hearing, on the grounds that she
was likely to become a "public charge. 4 3 Justice Gray wrote, "It is an accepted
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as in-
herent in sovereignty, and essential to preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe." 44 The Court then extended ple-
nary power from substantive to procedural immigration matters with the per-
plexing statement that while would-be immigrants possessed some due process
rights, they extended only so far as Congress should declare.45
Congress extended the ban on Chinese workers in 1892 and provided that a
worker already in the United States could stay only if he obtained a certificate
of residency based on the testimony of a credible white witness. In 1893, the
(1989).
39. In 1880, the United States had convinced China to amend the Burlingame Treaty by allowing
the U.S. to "regulate, limit or suspend" the immigration of additional Chinese laborers while promising
that those who were already in the United States could "go and come of their own free will." See Moto-
mura, supra note 10, at 550.
40. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589-90 (1889).
41. Id. at 600. Under the "last in time" rule, if there is an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty
obligation and a federal statute, federal courts will enforce that which is most recent. See infra note 254.
42. Id. at 606.
43. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892).
44. Id. at 659.
45. Id. at 660 ("As to [foreigners], the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting with
powers expressly conferred by Congress are due process of law.").
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Supreme Court rejected the claims of Fong Yue Ting and two other Chinese
laborers who, everyone agreed, were long-term residents but had no white wit-
nesses to testify.46 Justice Gray extended Congress's plenary power from the
exclusion of those first arriving to the deportation of permanent residents47 and
refused to characterize deportation as punishment that would trigger heightened
48
constitutional scrutiny. Three dissenters argued that some constitutional pro-
tections should apply, but no one questioned Congress's right to exclude on the
basis of race or nationality.
49
The plenary power doctrine in immigration law is premised explicitly on
the notion that the political branches of the federal government are responsible
for the nation's security and for its relations with other sovereigns. Thus, the
fact that those subject to this plenary power are not U.S. citizens-tellingly
designated "aliens" in immigration law-is key to their identification as Other.
However, in other areas of the law, citizenship is intertwined with the exercise
of plenary power in complex and confusing ways and warrants some examina-
tion.
Citizenship is only mentioned once in the Constitution, in its directive to
Congress to enact "an uniform Rule of Naturalization. Congress did so
promptly in 1790, limiting naturalized citizenship to "free white persons. 51 In
Dred Scott the Supreme Court clarified that persons of African descent,
52whether enslaved or "free," were emphatically not U.S. citizens, and a series
of "prerequisite" cases determining "whiteness" for naturalization purposes
established that neither Indians nor Asians could be naturalized. 53 Thus, until
1868, racial restrictions ensured a fairly close correlation between "citizens"
and those protected by the Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment's declaration that "all persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof' are citizens
was clearly intended to apply to African Americans. In 1898, at the same time
that Congress was considering additional immigration restrictions,5" a divided
46. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
47. Id. at 713-14, 723-24.
48. Id. at 733-34.
49. Id. at 732-763.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
51. Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed by the Act of January 19, 1795, which re-
enacted most of its provisions, including its racial restrictions).
52. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
53. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness, " and Racial Hier-
archy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997).
54. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 98 (1987).
In 1896, just before the Supreme Court decided Plessy, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had introduced a
bill to add a literacy test to existing immigration restrictions, arguing that it would favor the English and
Northern/Western Europeans, keeping out Eastern/Southern Europeans and "Asiatics." Id.
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Supreme Court held in United States v. Wong Kim Ark55 that "all persons" in-
cluded not only those deemed "white" or "black," but also those of "Mongo-
lian" descent. Thus, although Asians could not become naturalized citizens un-
til the mid-1900s, 56 their children did become U.S. citizens by virtue of birth
"in the territory."
On the other hand, in 1884 the Supreme Court held in Elk v. Wilkins57 that
Indians were not citizens by birth:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and ow-
ing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes, (an alien though dependent
power,) although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more
"born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," ... than the chil-
dren of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that govern-
ment.
5 8
Subsequently, however, in its efforts to "assimilate" Indians, Congress passed
statutes imposing U.S. citizenship on Indians whether they wanted it or not.
59
Residents of U.S. territorial possessions have at times been designated "U.S.
nationals" rather than citizens and although most are now designated citizens,
they do not have all the rights of "full" citizens. As a result of all these devel-
opments, those subjected to the plenary power doctrine may or may not be U.S.
citizens, but nonetheless are consistently treated as "outsiders" both in popular
• • 61
consciousness and in U.S. jurisprudence.
B. Indian Nations
The plenary power doctrine is a cornerstone not only of immigration law,
55. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
56. In 1870, after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, eligibility was extended to "persons of
African descent." Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, sec. 7, 16 Stat. 254. Restrictions with respect to Asians
were not completely eliminated until 1952. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163
(1952).
57. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
58. Id. at 102.
59. The General Allotment Act, sec. 6, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), declared all Indians bom within the
territorial limits of the United States to whom allotments had been made to be citizens. Citizenship was
imposed on all Indians pursuant to acts passed in 1924 (43 Stat. 253, June 2, 1924) and 1940 (Nation-
ality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1172, Oct. 14, 1940). See generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the
Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native American: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 107 (1999).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 177-184, 188.
61. See Vine Deloria, Jr., The Application of the Constitution to American Indians, in EXILED IN
THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 282, 282 (Oren
R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., 1992 ) ("American Indians have been forced to live within a politi-
cal/legal no man's land from which there seems to be no possibility of extrication."). See generally
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1992); Ediberto Roman, Mem-
bers and Outsiders: An Examination of the Models of United States Citizenship as Well as Questions
Concerning European Union Citizenship, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 81 (2000/200 1); William
R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights
Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. I (1995).
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but also of what is called federal Indian law.62 By the time Congress officially
suspended treaty making in 1871, the United States had entered into approxi-
mately 400 ratified and another 400 unratified treaties with Indian nations.
63
Initially, there was no doubt that these were agreements with independent sov-
ereigns. Indeed, the newly emergent United States, militarily weak and anxious
to appear legitimate in a community of nations that did not look kindly upon
colonies declaring their independence, wanted both the specific benefits em-
bodied in the treaties and the recognition of legitimacy they implied.64 Siegfried
Wiessner says,
[T]here is no credible way to interpret out of existence the fact that the budding new
player in the international arena of the 18th and 19th century, the United States, for
whatever reason, did enter into treaties of friendship and alliance on a perfectly
level playing field with the Indian nations. It treated them with the same respect,
extending to them the same courtesies as to other nations of the then overwhelm-
ingly European international legal order.
6 5
As its relative military power grew, however, the U.S. government imposed
its will on the hundreds of indigenous nations it encountered with increasing
frequency, violating both its own treaties and more generally applicable inter-
national law.66 The domestic jurisprudence rationalizing such actions emerged
from a trilogy of opinions authored by Justice Marshall in the 1820s and '30s:
67 .68Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Geor-
gia.69 Although these cases continue to be cited to support the complete subor-
dination of Indian nations, Marshall's assertions actually were much more lim-
62. The term "federal Indian law" is a misnomer because Indian nations have had and continue to
have their own law which is quite distinct from that of the United States. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1 (1998) (.'Indian Law' might be better termed 'Federal Law About Indi-
ans."'). For a description of some actual Indian law, see, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS
TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1999).
63. See CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1940-41) for a compilation
of ratified treaties, and VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN DIPLOMACY; TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999), for documents
omitted by Kappler. In the years since 1871, the U.S. has entered into hundreds of agreements that ac-
knowledge some degree of Indian sovereignty. It continues to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty
when it directly benefits U.S. interests, as do its agreements with federally approved and funded "tribal
governments" to permit the extraction of radioactive materials or the storage of hazardous wastes on
Indian reservations. See generally WARD CHURCHILL, Geographies of Sacrifice: The Radioactive
Colonization of Native North America, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN
RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 239-92 (1999).
64. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 22-28 (Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz & Larry Emerson
eds., 1979).
65. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 567, 591 (1995).
66. See generally DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 287-333 (1990); Wiessner, supra note 65, at 584.
67. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
68. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
69. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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ited.7°
In repudiating Georgia's claim to jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, Mar-
shall acknowledged in Worcester that
[f]rom the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts to regulate
trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their
rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly con-
sider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within thos Iboundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by
the United States.
Nonetheless, Marshall's assertion in Cherokee Nation that Indian nations were
neither independent foreign countries nor states of the union, consigning them
to the legal twilight zone of "domestic dependent nations" whose "relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian ' 72 has been used to
justify continued assertion of plenary power by Congress. Nell Newton says,
Both Johnson and the Cherokee Cases were concerned with upholding federal su-
premacy in Indian affairs over states and individuals. The federal goal was to obtain
cessions of land and to ensure peace.., by promises of protection from outsiders
meddling with Indian land or sovereignty. From these two concepts-property in-
terest and guardianship---the Court in the late nineteenth century gradually devel-
oped a guardianship power over Indian tribes, which it frankly acknowledged to be
70. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REV. 381 (1993) (arguing that Marshall struck a
relatively coherent balance between colonialism and constitutionalism that is overlooked by contempo-
rary commentators); Helen W. Winston, "An Anomaly Unknown:" Supreme Court Application of In-
ternational Law Norms on Indigenous Rights in the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 339 (1994) (analyzing the cases in the context of international law as articulated by Hugo
Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel).
In Johnson Marshall used the "doctrine of discovery" to justify U.S. occupation of Indian lands, but
he recognized that the doctrine only gave the "discovering" colonial power a preemptive right to obtain
the land either by purchase from a willing indigenous seller or by lawful conquest. Johnson, 21 U.S. at
587; see also Newton, supra note 10, at 209, 248. As Newton points out, this doctrine was dramatically
misstated by Chief Justice Taney, author of the Dred Scott opinion, in United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 567 (1846) (claiming that the doctrine negated Indian ownership interests in their land and
subjected them to U.S. political authority).
Marshall said in Johnson, "Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny,
whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of
the claim which has been successfully asserted." Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 588. One of the many
problems with this argument is the fact that most of the Indian land had not been taken by conquest, yet
Marshall did not restrict his argument to those indigenous nations that had been "conquered." In fact, he
extended it to all Indians in the territories to which the United States envisioned itself as extending-
nations that had not as of yet seen, or perhaps even heard, of white settlers, much less the United States
government. Marshall clarified in Worcester that "conquest" was only legitimate in the context of a
"just" war which, in turn, required Indian aggression. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 545-547; see also Newton,
supra note 10, at 248. International law at that time recognized a right of conquest, but only under par-
ticular terms, most of which the United States had not complied with. See infra text accompanying
notes 287-306.
71. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57.
72. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
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extraconstitutional.
73
The United States proceeded to forcibly remove not only the Cherokee, but
virtually all eastern Indian nations, onto reservations west of the Mississippi
River in clear violation of its treaty obligations. By the 1880s, most indigenous
resistance had been crushed and Euroamerican settlers pressed for complete
control not only of the land and resources but also of the people on reserva-
tions. The Major Crimes Act of 188574 was a significant step toward settler
control, asserting federal jurisdiction for the first time over certain crimes
committed by Indians on reservations, whether or not within the boundaries of
a state. The Supreme Court upheld the Act in United States v. Kagama,75 say-
ing that the United States could exercise such authority over Indians and that
constitutionally such power rested with the federal, not state, government. The
Kagama Court first declared that Indian nations had not been truly sovereign
since the Cherokee Cases of the 1830s, but were "semi-independent" with lim-
ited authority over their "internal and social relations." 76 Acknowledging that
the Constitution did not explicitly delegate jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the
federal government, the Court fell back on the notion that such power must be
inherent, relying on cases that dealt with Congress's power to regulate territo-
ries that had not yet become states, and drawing on Justice Marshall's earlier
pronouncement that "[t]he right to govern may be the inevitable consequence
of the right to acquire territory."
77
The year after Kagama, the government moved to break up what remained
of Indian land and political organization through the Allotment Act, "extin-
guishing Indian tribal lands, allotting the same in severalty among those enti-
tled to receive them, and distributing Indian tribal funds. 78 Although the Su-
preme Court had held in Elk v. Wilkins that Indians were not citizens by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Allotment Act required any individual who
accepted allotted land to accept U.S. citizenship as well. Despite tremendous
Indian resistance, the federal government took collectively held lands, allotted
the worst portions to individuals and sold the "surplus" to white settlers, a pro-
cess that resulted in the loss of about two-thirds of Indian-held land.79
73. Newton, supra note 10, at 207 (internal citations omitted).
74. Indian Appropriation Act of 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
75. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
76. Id. at 381-82.
77. Id. at 380 (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 US (I Pet) 511, 542 (1828)).
78. Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 466 (1933).
79. BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V. HTCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS & INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 2 (1994) ("After removal from their homelands earlier in the century, allotment
was the most traumatic federal policy affecting Indian people."). See also DAVID E. WILKINS,
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 64-117
(1997). In other challenges to the Allotment Act, the Court held that the plenary power allowed Indian
property, even land held in fee simple, to be "subject to the administrative control of the government,"
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902), due to the Indians' "condition of depend-
ency," Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899).
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Allotment was challenged in Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock,80 a suit brought by a
Kiowa band chief who accepted an allotment under coercion and then tried to
halt the assignment of allotments.81 According to Lone Wolf, the Allotment Act
violated (1) the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, which provided that any al-
ienation of Kiowa land required the consent of three-quarters of the nation's
adult men and (2) Fifth Amendment due process. On the Fifth Amendment
claim the Court projected the reasoning of Kagama back to the "beginning" of
U.S. jurisprudence with the counter-factual argument that "[p]lenary authority
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject
to be controlled by the judicial department of the government." 82 With respect
to the treaty claim, the Court relied on the domestic rule that when a statute is
in irreconcilable conflict with a treaty, the last in time will be enforced. The
case thus acknowledges Indian nations as separate sovereignties with whom the
United States treated and illustrates that U.S. courts have interpreted the Con-
stitution to allow governmental actions that clearly violate international law.
The application of the plenary power doctrine to uphold the Allotment Act
meant, in practical terms, that between 1887 and 1934 Indian nations lost 90
million acres of reservation land, more than two-thirds of their former hold-
ings.83 Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache landholdings went from just under 160
acres per capita in the 1880s to 17 acres in 1934. 84 According to Blue Clark:
Loss of land, lack of rental and lease income, and few marketable skills left the
Kiowa deeply impoverished by the 1920s, with an unemployment rate among
Kiowa males above 60 percent, establishing a pattern that persists down to the pres-
ent. The Lone Wolf decision cast a whole people into an economic coma. All the
Indians became a casualty.
8 5
Plenary power over Indian nations is alternately attributed to (1) the "Indian
Commerce Clause," (2) the federal government's control over "territories" that
are not states, and (3) powers "inherent in sovereignty"-the United States'
sovereignty, of course. None of these actually give the government such power.
First, the only explicit constitutional reference to Indian affairs gives Congress
the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
80. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
81. CLARK, supra note 79, at 2.
82. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
83. Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1934) (memorandum of John Collier), reprinted in DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 73-75 (1979).
84. CLARK, supra note 79, at 95.
85. Id. at 96. The government's attorney in the Lone Wolf case, Willis Van Devanter, was subse-
quently appointed to the Supreme Court by President Taft in 1911. Id. at 101. He was the author of
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), which held that an enfranchised Indian could still be sub-
ject to the plenary power of Congress. WILKINS, supra note 79, at 25 ("Nice served to seal the status of
tribal Indians in perpetual legal and political limbo.").
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States, and with the Indian Tribes." 86 This is a recognition that Indian nations
are separate from the United States, and thus entities with whom the United
States can have commerce, not a delegation of power over Indians.
87
Second, even if "the right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of
the right to acquire territory," 88 what is the source of the right to acquire? Fed-
eral jurisdiction over territories is said to come from Article IV, which says that
"Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.,89 This does not address how territory can be acquired, or whether the
United States can hold territory it does not intend to incorporate into the Union.
In any case, territory can only be lawfully acquired under international law-
the law recognized by Justice Marshall and other jurists of the day-by treaty
or by conquest in a "just" war.90 In this case, a just war could only have been
waged in response to unprovoked aggression by the Indian nations, and none of
the military campaigns waged against Indian nations fit this description. 91 Thus,
to the extent that the United States acquired territory lawfully, it was by treaty.
Third, the Constitution provides that only the President, with the concur-
rence of two-thirds of the Senate, can enter into treaties, 92 and treaties are by
definition agreements between sovereign entities.93 As a result, recognition of
U.S. sovereignty over lawfully acquired territory requires concomitant recogni-
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87. It is, in fact, a delegation of power that the government has over U.S. citizens. The history of
the clause clearly indicates that its purpose was to ensure that relations with Indians nations were han-
dled by the federal government, not the states, notwithstanding Justice Stevens' pronouncement that
"the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to leg-
islate in the field of Indian affairs." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
See also Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 119-20 & 119 n. 139 (1993).
88. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,542 (1828).
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
90. As discussed supra note 70, the discovery doctrine did not justify the taking of land, but only
clarified the relative rights of the colonizing powers to negotiate with the indigenous owners.
91. See WARD CHURCHILL, Perversions of Justice: Examining the Doctrine of US. Rights to Oc-
cupancy in North America, in WARD CHURCHILL READER (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author) (ap-
plying the theory to the U.S. context); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 58-63 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the "legalist paradigm"
of aggression as a justification for war). See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. , THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990). For the U.S. govem-
ment's position, see generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (reprint 1981)
(1942).
92. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2 gives the President the "Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate to make Treaties."
93. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as any "international agreement
governed by international law and concluded in written form between one or more states." Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, March 21, 1986, art. 2, sec. l(a), 25 I.L.M. 543. In addition, the Constitution forbids
states to enter into treaties and, therefore, the federal government cannot enter into treaties with states
or, presumably, any other of its own political subdivisions. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 1. ("No
State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation .... ").
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tion of the sovereignty of the nations from whom the territory was obtained.94
Thus, each of the commonly accepted justifications for the exercise of ple-
nary power over Indian nations falls apart under scrutiny. A more honest ex-
planation is the Supreme Court's conclusion in Kagama that authority over In-
dians "must exist in [the federal] government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes,"95 an argument remarkably close to
"might makes right."
C. External Colonies
The government soon extended plenary power arguments based on the ac-
quisition of territory to external colonies.96 By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a primary political question was whether the United States would continue
to expand, becoming an explicitly imperialist power like the European nations
it was emulating.97 In 1893, following a plan that had been quite successful in
Texas, 98 American business interests backed by the Marines overthrew the Ha-
waiian monarchy and installed a republican government which the United
States quickly recognized. 99 Eventually, of course, Hawai'i was incorporated
into the United States, making it a territory that remains colonized but with a
domestic legal status distinct from that of unincorporated territories explicitly
subject to the plenary power.100
94. However, the United States' willingness to disregard international law was articulated clearly
in the 1870 Cherokee Tobacco case, upholding a congressional decision to pass an act in violation of a
treaty "as if the treaty were not an element to be considered." The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621
(1870). See also CLARK, supra note 79, at 14.
95. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
96. For a thorough compilation of the history, law, and current status of U.S. territories, see
ARNOLD H. LEIBoWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989).
97. McKinley's election in 1900 was generally perceived as a mandate for imperialism. See
STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, "BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION": THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903, at 21-27 (1982); Christina Duffy Bumett & Burke Marshall, Between the For-
eign and the Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN ExPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 4
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds. 2001).
98. See ACUr1A, supra note 27, at 9-12, 25-53 (describing the "invasion" and "colonization of
Texas").
99. When the U.S. did not immediately annex Hawai'i, Roosevelt called it "a crime against white
civilization." ZINN, supra note 28, at 293. Hawai'i was annexed in 1898, pursuant to a joint resolution
of Congress known as the Newlands Resolution, 30 STAT. 750 (July 7, 1898). See HAUNANI-KAY
TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I 16 (2d ed. 1998)
("Once the Republic of Hawai'i declared itself on July 4, 1894, the "Americanization" of Hawai'i was
sealed like a coffin."); Chris K. lijima, Race Over Rice: Binary Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First
Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91,
103-108 (2000). See generally Lisa Cami Oshiro, Recognizing Na Kanaka Maoli s Right to Self-
Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 65 (1995).
100. Although Congress officially "apologized" for the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian govern-
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During this time, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were successfully
waging wars of independence against Spanish colonialism. In 1898, with Spain
close to defeat, the United States stepped in and quickly claimed victory in
what "John Hay, the American Secretary of State, later called 'a splendid little
war."10 1 As a result, rather than gaining their independence, Cuba, Puerto
Rico, Guam and the Philippines were "ceded" by Spain to the United States
pursuant to a treaty providing that "[t]he civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants ... shall be determined by the [United States] Congress."' 0 2
Despite the fear that Cuba would become "another black republic" like Haiti,
103
Congress had passed a resolution declaring that Cuba would not be annexed, so
control there was exercised through military and then economic means.1°4 The
United States did, however, take direct possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Philippines.
In the Philippines, indigenous resistance to American occupation was very
strong. In what was frequently described as an "Indian war"'1 5 with official di-
rectives to kill all males over the age of ten, American troops massacred the
population of entire villages and burned them to the ground, tortured and mur-
dered prisoners of war, raped women, and looted.' °6 This was done in the name
of the "pacification" and "benevolent assimilation" of a people described in the
report of a commission headed by William Howard Taft and praised highly by
both Theodore Roosevelt and Supreme Court Justice Brown, as
weaklings of low stature, with black skin, closely-curling hair, flat noses, thick lips,
and large, clumsy feet. In the matter of intelligence they stand at or near the bottom
of the human series, and they are believed to be incapable of any considerable de-
gree of civilization or advancement.
1 07
The question became the status of these "territories" under U.S. law, and
lawmakers turned to their colonial experience with Indians for legal as well as
military precedent. Clark notes,
ment, the U.S. continues to disregard Native Hawaiian rights to self-determination, a subject beyond the
scope of this article. See generally supra note 13.
101. ZINN, supra note 28, at 302; Jose A. Cabranes, Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 97, at 39.
102. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, Dec. 10,
1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 STAT. 1754. See Jose Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of
Liberty: an Alternative View of the Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1 (1999).
103. ZINN, supra note 28, at 296 (quoting Winston Churchill and noting that this sentiment was
shared by American leaders).
104. See Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra
note 97, at 64.
105. See MILLER, supra note 97, at 196-218.
106. See Id. at 196-218; ZINN, supra note 28, at 306-11. The purported justification for such
atrocities, as with the atrocities committed against Indians, was that these were not "civilized peoples,"
and therefore the rules of civilized warfare did not apply but "[i]n the Philippines, Americans often
seemed very much like their own worst image of the Malay savage: a people without law." Weiner, su-
pra note 104, at 73.
107. Weiner, supra note 104, at 66.
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Lone Wolf occurred just at the peak of American patriotic fervor over acquisition of
new overseas territories from Spain.... The decree summarized America's ap-
proach to island peoples acquired in the takeover of Spanish colonial possessions
after 1898. The subject status of the ward in Lone Wolfbecame the colonial status
of the overseas dependent of the Insular Cases .... A process of colonial political
incorporation and land expropriation on ocean possessions such as the Hawaiian
Islands similar to the American Indian experience rapidly took place, leaving the
native populace subordinate and increasingly landless. I
Speaking in the Senate on how the United States was to govern the Philip-
pines, Henry Cabot Lodge, a leading advocate of racially restrictive immigra-
tion policies, reached back to Justice Marshall's decisions justifying federal In-
dian policy in the Cherokee cases. According to Clark, Lodge "summarized
imperialists' views when he stated that national Supreme Court decisions de-
clared 'the United States could have under its control ... a "domestic depend-
ent nation,"' thereby solving for all time in his mind 'the question of our con-
stitutional relations to the Philippines' and other territories."'
0 9
A similar policy was followed in Puerto Rico, which the United States took
as a "territory" without significant military resistance. In 1901 the Supreme
Court directly confronted the meaning of this territorial status in Downes v.
Bidwell,110 a challenge to U.S. duties on Puerto Rican goods levied at fifteen
percent of duties on similar "foreign" goods. Was Puerto Rico part of the
United States and, if so, didn't the Commerce Clause preclude any duties at
all?
Downes and the other Insular Cases decided between 1901 and 1922, were
said to "have caused more turmoil on the Supreme Court than any other case
since Dred Scott."'' Downes generated five separate opinions in what is
sometimes characterized as a debate over whether the Constitution "follows the
flag." ' 12 Justice Brown, who had authored the majority opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson just five years earlier, 13 wrote "for the Court" though no other jus-
108. CLARK, supra note 79, at 101-102.
109. Id. at 102 (citing Cong. Rec. vol. 33, pt. 3, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate, 7 March 1900, p.
2618). Similarly, President McKinley instructed U.S. officials in the Philippines to "adopt the same
course" used in dealing with American Indians, permitting only very limited and closely supervised
local self-government. Id. at 103.
110. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
111. Cabranes, supra note 101, at 42 (quoting Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine
of Territorial Incorporation, 60 AM. L. REV. 801, 840 (1926)). While there is some dispute over which
cases constitute the "Insular Cases," there is general agreement that they start with Downes and go
through Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 US. 298 (1922), which held that the Jones Act, Pub. L.
No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951 (1917), which conferred U.S. citizenship but not representation on Puerto Ri-
cans, did not "incorporate" Puerto Rico into the United States. For an excellent in-depth analysis of
these cases, see Rivera Ramos, supra note 26; see also EFREN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN
PUERTO Rico 71-142 (2001).
112. For critiques of this phrasing, see FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 97, at 32 n.44.
113. Mark Weiner notes that Justice Henry Billings Brown begins his autobiography with the
statement, "I was born of a New England Puritan family in which there has been no admixture of alien
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tice joined his opinion. He held that Congress had complete discretion over
whether to extend the Constitution to the territories and was bound only to rec-
ognize the "natural" rights of the inhabitants. Efren Rivera Ramos summarizes
Justice Brown's opinion:
"The power to acquire territory by treaty," he affirmed, "implies not only the power
to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States will re-
ceive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall
termed the 'American Empire."' In sum, the plenary power of Congress arose from
the inherent right to acquire territory, the Territorial Clause, the treaty-making
power and the power to declare and conduct war. The Constitution applied to the
territories only to the degree that it was extended to them by Congress. As to the
probability of despotism resulting from such plenary power, the inhabitants of the
new territories should not fear: "there are certain principles of natural justice inher-
ent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no expression in constitutions or stat-
utes to give them effect or to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly
hostile to their real interests."
114
Justice White, concurring, said that the applicability of the Constitution
rested on whether a particular territory had been "incorporated" into the United
States; if it were "unincorporated," the inhabitants possessed only certain "fun-
damental" rights. With masterful legal sleight of hand he said,
while in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was
... owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States in a domestic
sense, because the island had not been inc ocrated into the United States, but was
merely appurtenant thereto as a possession.
Justice White's distinction between incorporation and possession allowed
the Court to rationalize the "owning" of external territory and the concomitant
control of its peoples without constitutional restrictions on the treatment of citi-
zens or the disposition of U.S. territory. Judge Cabranes says, "[i]t is fair to say
that it was devised in order to make colonialism possible."" 6 The dissenters
characterized both White's and Brown's positions as theories of extraconstitu-
tional governmental power. Justice Harlan warned, "It will be an evil day for
American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of
the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty
rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the
principles of the Constitution." 117 Nonetheless, the plenary power doctrine had
already done just that in immigration and Indian law, and was now firmly en-
blood for two hundred and fifty years." Weiner, supra note 104, at 69.
114. Rivera Ramos, supra note 26, at 246-47 (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at 280). Justice Brown
went on to reassure us that the fact that the Court had only once overturned Congressional action in the
territories is evidence that Congress can be counted on to act in good faith-that instance being Dred
Scott, in which Justice Taney held the Missouri Compromise invalid on the ground that Congress could
not prevent citizens from taking their property from one U.S. jurisdiction to another. 1d. at 280.
115. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-42.
116. Cabranes, supra note 101, at 43.
117. Downes, 182 U.S. at 382.
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sconced in "territorial law" as well.' 18
III. PLENARY POWER TODAY: THE DOCTRINE AND THE DESTRUCTION
Federal Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny backwater of law .... [Flew
areas, if any, are more fundamental to an assessment of the normative and institu-
tional components of American law. Indeed, federal Indian law is rooted in the most
basic of propositions about the American constitutional system: it is inescapably the
product both of the colonization of the western hemisphere by European sovereigns
and of the corresponding displacement of indigenous peoples."
9
The cases establishing the plenary power doctrine, from the Chinese Exclu-
sion Cases to Kagama and Lone Wolf to the Insular Cases, might just be his-
torical anomalies, except that they continue to be called on to justify the legal-
ized subordination of the Other as U.S. jurisprudence struggles to balance its
image of itself as a nation of laws with its desire to maintain structures of colo-
. . 120
nization. This Part looks at ways in which the plenary power doctrine con-tinues to exert a powerful influence on U.S. law.
A. Immigrants
While legal sanction of racial animus, such as that which fueled Chinese
exclusion, is generally presumed to be a thing of the past, the plenary power
doctrine that grew out of those cases is alive and well. No intervening legal de-
cisions have prohibited immigration laws that discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion, and the doctrine continues to be invoked
to exclude those perceived as Other.' The contemporary due process rights of
non-citizens who have not been officially admitted to the United States are still
118. Reflecting the consensus among the Justices that Puerto Ricans were distinctly Other, Jose
Trias Monge says that the plenary power doctrine articulated in Downes "flowed from the holding in
Plessy v. Ferguson." Trias Monge, supra note 102, at 4. Even Justice Harlan said in his dissent that
"[w]hether a particular race will or will not assimilate with our people, and whether they can or cannot
with safety to our institutions be brought within the operation of the Constitution, is a matter to be
thought of when it is proposed to acquire their territory by treaty. A mistake in the acquisition of terri-
tory... cannot be made the ground for violating the Constitution .. " Downes, 182 U.S. at 384
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
As Blue Clark notes, "[i]n chambers, it may have been Justice William Moody's lurid story graphi-
cally depicting the consequences of twelve tattooed savage chieftains filing into a jury room, resting
their spears and war trophies against the wall, and deliberating evidence in a jury trial that swept the
other Justices along into supporting White's Insular Doctrine." CLARK, supra note 79, at 104, citing
Robert B. Highsaw, Edward Douglas White: Defender of the Conservative Faith (1981).
119. Frickey, supra note 70, at 383.
120. See Frickey, supra note 70, at 383.
In a country that prides itself on following the rule of law, the justifications for colonization
uttered by those European explorers and recognized by the Supreme Court itself-to impose
Christianity upon the heathen, to make more productive use of natural resources, and so on-
do not go down easily in the late-twentieth century. Id.
121. Currently, this is often on the basis of perceived political beliefs or associations. See gener-
ally Philip Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power, and the PLO, 77 CAL. L. REv.
831 (1989).
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those expressed in Knauff v. Shaughnessy, a 1950 decision echoing Nishimura
Ekiu: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.,
122
In Knauff, a slim majority of the Court, citing to Nishimura Ekiu and Fong
Yue Ting, held that the German wife of a U.S. citizen, a woman who had per-
formed "excellent" work as a civilian employee of the U.S. War Department,
could be excluded without a hearing upon the assertion of the Attorney General
that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. 123
Going even further, in 1953, the Court held in Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei 124 that a permanent resident who had gone to Europe to visit his ail-
ing mother could be held indefinitely on Ellis Island, without a hearing, be-
cause the Attorney General had determined on the basis of confidertial infor-
mation that his entry would be "prejudicial to the public interest."'125 The fact
that Mezei had lived, in Justice Jackson's words, "a life of unrelieved insignifi-
cance" in Buffalo, New York for the past twenty-five years, and had nowhere
else to go, was irrelevant.
126
Federal courts have used these cases, in turn, to justify the indefinite deten-
tion of undocumented Cubans who came from the port of Mariel in 1980 and
were deemed "excludable" by U.S. immigration authorities; the detention of
Haitian refugees pending adjudication of their claims for political asylum; and
the subsequent interception and forced return of Haitians found on the high
seas. In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, the first significant ruling of this
series, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the release of a Mariel Cu-
ban who was clearly excludable under U.S. law but had no other place to go.
The court first identified the problem:
[T]he case law generally recognizes almost absolute power in Congress concerning
immigration matters, holding that aliens in petitioner's position cannot invoke the
Constitution to avoid exclusion and that detention pending deportation is only a
continuation of exclusion rather than "punishment" in the constitutional sense. [...
Yet, i]n the instant case the detention is imprisonment under conditions as severe as
we apply to our worst criminals. It is prolonged; perhaps it is permanent. 127
It ordered Rodriguez-Fernandez released under the immigration statute,
noting that if the statute were construed differently, problems would arise under
both the Constitution and international law. First, the court said that indefinite
detention was punishment subject to constitutional constraints: "Surely Con-
122. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
123. Id.
124. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
125. Id. at 208.
126. Again, to quote Justice Jackson's scathing dissent, "[g]ovenment counsel ingeniously argued
that Ellis Island is his 'refuge,' whence he is free to leave in any direction except west. That might mean
freedom, if only he were an amphibian!" Id. at 220.
127. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981).
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gress could not order the killing of Rodriguez-Fernandez and others in his
status on the ground that Cuba would not take them back and this country does
not want them."'128 It countered Supreme Court precedent from Fong Yue Ting
to Mezei by arguing that "[n]o principle of international law is more funda-
mental than the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary im-
prisonment," citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights.
29
Unfortunately, other federal courts of appeal have not followed the Tenth
Circuit's attempt to bring those subject to the exercise of plenary power under
the protections of international law.13 In 1984 the Eleventh Circuit, relying on
Fong Yue Ting, Nishimura Ekiu, Mezei, and other plenary power "classics" of
immigration law, held in Jean v. Nelson that non-citizens who have not been
admitted continue to "have no constitutional rights with regard to their applica-
tions, and must be content to accept whatever statutory rights and privileges
they are granted by Congress.",131 The following year the Supreme Court re-
fused to grant certiorari in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 132 which followed Jean, not-
ing specifically that claims under international human rights law were inappli-
cable. As the Eleventh Circuit said in Garcia-Mir, "These legal realities may be
harsh, but they are that way by design."'
' 33
The consequences grew harsher in the 1990s. In 1993 the Supreme Court
allowed the detention of unaccompanied children in Reno v. Flores,134 uphold-
ing an INS policy that resulted in the imprisonment of about 1000 children per
year, often in adult facilities, rather than releasing them to non-custodial family
members or guardians. 135 In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
128. Id. at 1387.
129. Id. at 1388.
130. Thus, the Fourth Circuit upheld the indefinite detention of "excludable aliens," Palma v. Ver-
deyen, 676 F.2d. 100 (4th Cir. 1982), and the Second Circuit reversed a district court decision ordering
the release of detained Haitians, Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1982). Similarly, a district
court holding unconstitutional the indefinite detention of Mariel Cubans pursuant to the Immigration
and Nationality Act was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit. Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F.Supp. 1115
(N.D.Ga. 1983), rev'd 734 F.2d 576 (11 th Cir. 1984).
131. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (11th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court ruled that the Elev-
enth Circuit should not have reached the constitutional question, and declined to revisit Knauff or
Mezei. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-55 (1984).
132. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 th Cir. 1986), cert. deniedsub nom Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
133. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (1 1th Cir. 1984). Thus, for example, even though
Cuban prisoners have been held in maximum security federal penitentiaries, subjected to strip searches
and beatings, and moved arbitrarily from facility to facility, apparently they have no Eighth Amendment
rights because INS detention is civil, not criminal, per Fong Yue Ting and its progeny. See Richard A.
Boswell, Book Review, Throwing Away the Key: Limits on the Plenary Power?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
689, 702 (1997). For an excellent summary of the plenary power doctrine in this context, see Margaret
H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the Ple-
nary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995).
134. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
135. George Michael C. Ranalli, Casenote, Reno v. Flores: Plenary Power Over Immigration Alive
and Well, 45 MERCER L. REV. 889, 889 n.1 (1994). In 1990 the INS arrested more than 8,500 nonciti-
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grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)" 3 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act' 37 dramatically reduced due process rights and judicial re-
view of immigration decisions, and retroactively rendered permanent residents
deportable based on prior criminal convictions.
138
In 2001 the Supreme Court suggested in Zadvydas v. Davis139 that Con-
gress's plenary power "is subject to important constitutional limitations" that
qualify the government's ability to indefinitely detain permanent residents who
are to be deported but do not have countries willing to accept them.'4 ° While
this decision has allowed lower courts some discretion to ameliorate the harsh-
est consequences of the 1996 acts,' 41 it does not signal a fundamental change in
the plenary power doctrine, for the Zadvydas opinion cites Mezei and the Chi-
nese Exclusion Cases with approval and relies more on ambiguity in the statute
than on the Constitution to support its conclusion.
142
Recent cases merge exclusion based on race or national origin with exclu-
sion based on political belief or association, allowing the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to use secret evidence to detain and deport a num-
ber of Muslims and persons of Arab descent. 143 Georgetown law professor
David Cole, who represented thirteen individuals in such deportation cases,
testified before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee that
[a]t one time the INS claimed that all 13 posed a direct threat to the security of the
nation, and that the evidence to support that assertion could not be revealed-in
many instances could not even be summarized-without jeopardizing national secu-
rity. Yet in none of these cases did the INS's secret evidence even allege, much less
prove, that the aliens had engaged in or supported any criminal, much less terrorist,
zen minors, roughly 70 percent of whom were unaccompanied. Id.
136. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
137. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
138. See generally Victoria Cook Capitaine, Life in Prison Without a Trial: The Indefinite Deten-
tion of Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEx. L. REv. 769 (2001); Lucas Guttentag, Slamming the
Courthouse Door: Immigrants and the Right to Judicial Review, 28 HUM. RTS. 19 (2001); Lisa J. Lap-
lante, Expedited Removal at the US. Borders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 213 (1999); Anne E. Pettit, Note, "One Manner of Law": The Supreme Court, Stare
Decisis and the Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 24 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 165 (1996).
139. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
140. Id. at 695, citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983).
141. See, eg., Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Zadvydas to find pre-
removal mandatory detention unconstitutional as applied to petitioner); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299
(3rd Cir. 2001) (citing Zadvydas and applying heightened due process scrutiny to pre-removal-order
detention of a long-term permanent resident).
142. 533 U.S. at 696 ("Despite this constitutional problem, if Congress has made its intent in the
statute clear, we must give effect to that intent.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and
the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASiAN L.J. 1, 14-24 (2001); David Cole, Hanging
With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 S.CT. REV. 203
(1999); Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regu-
lation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY's L.J.
833 (1997).
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activity. 144
The INS sought to preempt constitutional challenges to its use of secret
evidence by invoking Congress's plenary power, citing the Chinese Exclusion
Cases as well as Knauff and Mezei. 145 At least one federal court has forced the
INS to reveal its evidence and, seeing how flimsy it was, ordered the detainees
released. 146 However, the Supreme Court effectively undermined the ability of
the courts to force the INS to reveal its evidence by holding in Reno v. Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee147 that after the passage of IIRIRA
federal courts have dramatically limited jurisdiction to review deportation deci-
sions at all. This was another victory for the plenary power doctrine, one that
set the stage for the Justice Department's current assertion that it can indefi-
nitely detain non-citizens of "Middle Eastern origin" in the wake of the attacks
on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. 141
B. Indian Nations
Indians within the United States today are subject to all of the laws gov-
erning U.S. citizens and, in addition, to several thousand additional statutes.
14 9
144. Hearing on the Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedings and H.R. 2121 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 106th Cong (2000), avail-
able at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/cole0210.html (statement of Professor David Cole, Georgetown
University Law Center).
145. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting writ of habeas
corpus).
146. In attempting to deport 22-year-old Fouad Rafeedie, a permanent resident, as he returned from
Syria where he had attended a conference affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales-
tine, the INS held no hearing and put forth no evidence, in open court or on the record, claiming that to
do so would be "prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security of the United States." Rafeedie v.
INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989), remanded to 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). The D.C. Circuit
rejected the INS's argument and refused to hear the evidence in camera, noting that "Rafeedie-like
Joseph K. in The Trial-can prevail ... only if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence against him ....
It is difficult to imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden." 880
F.2d at 516. On remand, the district court ordered him released. 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992). Federal
courts also ordered detainees released in Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (2000) (holding peti-
tioner's due process rights were violated by ex parte presentation and reliance on secret evidence, and
that mere "association" with a terrorist organization was not sufficient to require detention), and
Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting writ of habeas corpus), 92 F. Supp. 2d
403 (D.N.J. 2000) (granting attorney's fees).
See also JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 128-37 (1999) (summarizing secret evidence
cases); Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets KaJka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclu-
sion, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L. J. 57, 73-81 (1999) (summarizing secret evidence cases).
147. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). See generally
John A. Scanlan, American-Arab-Getting the Balance Wrong-Again!, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 347
(2000).
148. See generally Farah Brelvi, Un-American Activities: Racial Profiling and the Backlash after
Sept. 11, 48 FED. LAW. 69 (2001); Rebecca Carr, Sweeping Anti-Terrorism Powers Questioned,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 29, 2001, at 1OA; Rebecca Carr, War on Terrorism: Ashcroft: Critics Help
the Enemy, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 7, 2001, at 13A; Lois Romano & David S. Fallis, Questions Swirl
Around Men Held in Terror Probe, WASH. POST. Oct. 15, 2001, at 1A.
149. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 83. As Justice Blackmun noted in County of
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This system of federal law, which imposes a quasi-sovereign status on Indian
nations and subjects them to the "trusteeship" of the United States government,
embodies the contemporary plenary power doctrine. Robert Clinton states,
"Vestiges of the law's historic colonial role in legitimating conquest and ex-
propriation remain imbedded in the doctrines employed today allegedly to pro-
tect Indian interests."' 5 ° While this Article cannot address the extensive reach
of this doctrine and the concomitant damage to Indian communities, it will
briefly describe a few illustrative cases.
In 1955 the Tlingits of Alaska lost their claim to most Alaskan land when
the Supreme Court held, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,15 1 that in-
digenous land is not protected by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or
its requirement of just compensation. Reading applicable law exactly back-
wards, the Court held that aboriginal title would be recognized only if the U.S.
government had entered into a treaty or enacted a statute granting an indige-
nous nation the right to permanently occupy its ancestral land. 52 Justice Reed's
opinion misconstrued the Cherokee Cases to say they permitted the arbitrary
confiscation of indigenous lands without compensation, based on the U.S. con-
quest of all Indian nations-evidently even those it had never fought., 53 New-
ton states, "Tee-Hit-Ton reveals a judicial attitude so committed to congres-
sional deference that the Court was willing to engage in the intellectual
dishonesty of characterizing the acquisition of Alaska as a conquest to avoid
protecting tribal rights. '54 As a result, billions of dollars in oil revenue have
gone to the state of Alaska and to oil companies. The Tlingits, on the other
hand, remain among the poorest people under U.S. jurisdiction.'
In the 1970s the Supreme Court hinted that it might curtail application of
the plenary power doctrine to Indians, but this has not happened. In 1973 Jus-
tice Marshall announced in McLanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission that
the Court "had ceased reliance on the colonial notion of a trusteeship over Indi-
ans as an extra-constitutional source of Congressional power over their
lives. ' 56 Nonetheless, five years later, he justified the unilateral extension of
much of the Bill of Rights to Indian nations in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), reaching a
decision in cases affecting Indian rights requires "wander(ing) the maze of Indian statutes and case law
dating back 100 years."
150. Clinton, supra note 87, at 109.
151. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
152. See id. at 277-78, 285.
153. See id. at 278-79; see also Newton, supra note 10, at 248.
154. Newton, supra note 10, at 249.
155. Id. at 248 & n.299. In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, Justice Reed noted that if Indian title were to be
considered compensable without specific congressional authorization, there would be pending claims
aggregating nine trillion dollars. 348 U.S. 272, 283 & n.17. See David E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 168-85 (1997).
156. Clinton, supra note 87, at 114, citing McLanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S.
164 (1973).
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by stating, "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.'
157
In 1974, in Mancari v. Morton,158 the Supreme Court seemed to be impos-
ing constitutional constraints on plenary power when it engaged in an equal
protection analysis of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) policy giving preferen-
tial treatment to Indian employment. 59 However, the Court has used Mancari
to reinforce rather than curb the exercise of plenary power, citing it in 1977 in
Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks to justify deference to congres-
sional decisions regarding the use of Indian funds.' Additionally, in United
States v. Antelope, 161 the Court upheld the application of federal criminal law
against an equal protection challenge brought by an Indian who argued that
white defendants committing the same act in the same place had the benefit of
the more lenient provisions of state law. 62 Newton states, "The Antelope Court
announced that all legislation regarding tribal Indians had a legitimate govern-
mental purpose: to govern Indian tribes. Furthermore, under an equal protection
challenge, all such legislation would be permissible if not invidiously motivated
and not irrational."'
63
Justice Rehnquist's 1978 opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish converted pre-
existing Indian sovereignty to "delegated sovereignty" (delegated by the U.S.
government) and held that Indian nations were precluded from trying non-
Indians for crimes committed on reservations unless Congress had expressly
delegated such power to them by treaty or by statute. 164 Oliphant was extended
in 1990 in Duro v. Reina, which held that Indian criminal jurisdiction is limited
to "tribal members" and not "non-member Indians"165 despite historical evi-
dence that Indian courts had exercised jurisdiction over non-member Indians
since their establishment. 66 Newton states, "Whatever Congress wants, Con-
157. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). While including language apparently
supportive of indigenous sovereignty, the Court concluded by citing Lone Wolf for the "extraordinarily
broad" authority Congress possesses over Indian matters. Id. at 72. See also Clinton, supra note 87, at
115; Newton, supra note 10, at 265.
158. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
159. The policy was allowed as primarily "political rather than racial in nature." Id. at 553 n.24.
160. 430 U.S. 73 (1977). For an argument that both Weeks and United States v. Sioux Nation, 448
U.S. 371 (1980), represent the emergence of constitutional limitations on Congress' plenary power, see
Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
235 (1982).
161. 430 US 641 (1977).
162. Id.
163. Newton, supra note 10, at 280. This analysis was extended from individuals to Indian nations
in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
164. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
165. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
166. Robert Clinton argues that Duro, along with Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 676 (1990), and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), signal an era in which the federal judiciary will "foster a kind of neo-colonialist control of In-
dian interests by non-Indian majorities through federal Indian law." Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Ju-
dicial Political Activism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED.
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gress gets, and Mancari and its progeny are now increasingly impressed to
serve that end."' 167 Blue Clark concludes,
In spite ofjudicial whittling away at it, plenary authority remains one of the corner-
stones of federal dominance of Indian affairs. Courts currently recognize that ple-
nary power extends over Indian affairs, regulation of liquor traffic, disposition of
tribal property and trust funds, and federal intervention in tribal activities through
secretarial discretion, as well as Congress's action, and in the exercise of Indian
sovereignty. 6t
As a result of the exercise of plenary power, a "trust" relationship has been
imposed on Indian nations by the U.S. government which has resulted in geno-
cidal and ecocidal policies of almost unimaginable proportions. Generations of
Indian children have been forcibly removed from their families and imprisoned
in "boarding schools" where they were stripped of their culture, traumatized,
and often sexually abused. 169 In some periods the BIA Indian Health Services
sterilized up to one-half of all Indian women of childbearing age, against their
will and often without informing them. 170 The government has leased the most
profitable land and mineral resources to white individuals and corporations at
prices dramatically-sometimes 90 0/o-below market value.171 Corporations
have been allowed to strip mine and produce radioactive waste, often leaving it
B. NEWS & J. 92 (1991). In Brendale, the Court held that the Yakima Nation could not regulate a non-
Indian owned parcel in an open section of their reservation, but could do so in a closed portion. 492
U.S. at 445. In Employment Division, the Court held that members of the Native American Church had
no constitutionally protected right to use peyote in religious practices. Employment Division, 494 U.S.
at 890. See also Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divesti-
ture ofIndian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1999) (noting that this exercise
of "extraordinary authority in an area in which Congress has long operated with plenary power supports
the disturbing conclusion that the Court has assumed a legislative function-that of implementing the
ongoing colonial process").
167. Newton, supra note 10, at 285.
168. CLARK, supra note 79, at 109 (citations omitted). See also Newton, supra note 10, at 234,
expanding on this list of powers and the cases supporting them. The plenary power doctrine has also
been used to justify the requirement that Indian nations submit to state jurisdiction if they operate
gaming operations. See Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict
Among the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L.
REV. 127 (1993) (analyzing decisions under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497,
100 Stat. 2487 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1998 &
Supp. 1992)).
169. See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS
AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 (1995); David Wallace Adams, From Bullets to
Boarding Schools: The Educational Assault on the American Indian Identity, in THE AMERICAN
INDIAN EXPERIENCE, 1524 TO THE PRESENT: A PROFILE 218-39 (Philip Weeks ed., 1988); Raymond
Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation's Debt to the Indian Peoples,
21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941 (1999); Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United
States: Indoctrination for Subordination to Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA:
GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 371-402 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992).
170. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE
AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 377 (1997).
171. See, e.g., WARD CHURCHILL, Genocide in Arizona: The "Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute" in
Perspective, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE,
ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 177 (1999) (quoting estimates that the U.S. government was attempting
to pay the Shoshone less than one penny of actual value for each acre taken in Newe Segobia).
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in the immediate vicinity of Indian housing and schools. 17 2 The BIA has held
revenues from leases, other governmental appropriations, and amounts due un-
der treaties with no accountability, so that even today a suit is pending that
charges the BIA with having "lost" billions of dollars of trust funds. 17 3 Thus,
peoples who legally own significant land and resources constitute the poorest
sector of American society and their communities suffer from the lowest life
expectancies (in the 40s for both men and women on reservations), highest in-
fant mortality rates, highest suicide rates, and highest rates of death from expo-
sure, communicable diseases, and alcoholism in the United States.'
74
C. External Colonies
Today the United States holds about four million people in the "unincorpo-
rated territories" of Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, 175 the "U.S."
Virgin Islands, and "American" Samoa. 176 None is recognized as an independ-
ent country or a state of the union, and all are subject to the plenary power of
the U.S. government. Residents of American Samoa are U.S. "nationals"; those
of the other territories are "citizens," but without many of the rights of other
U.S. citizens. 77 As recently as 1998 federal appellate courts relied on Downes
172. See WARD CHURCHILL, Geographies of Sacrifice: The Radioactive Colonization of Native
North America, in CHURCHILL, supra note 171, at 239-91.
173. See Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding Secretaries of Interior and
Treasury in contempt for failing to produce documents relating to an alleged $4 billion of missing trust
funds), aff'd sub nom. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The amount in question is
unclear. The plaintiffs have alleged that $10 billion may have been mismanaged. See John Gibeaut, An-
other Broken Trust: After the Government's Bungling of a Land Allotment Program for Hundreds of
Thousands of Indians, All Eyes are Now on a Federal Judge Trying to Sort Out, ABA J., Sept. 1999, at
40. See generally Billee Elliott McAuliffe, Forcing Action: Seeking to "Clean Up" the Indian Trust
Fund: Cobell v. Babbit, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 647, 656 (2001) (discussing class action lawsuit for an ac-
counting of the government's management of Indian assets).
174. See Rennard Strickland, Buffalo Herd, in TONTO's REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN
INDIAN CULTURE AND POLICY 53 (1997).
175. On the history of the Mariana Islands, see Marie Rios-Martinez, Congressional Colonialism
in the Pacific: The Case of the Northern Mariana Islands and Its Covenant with the United States, 3
SCHOLAR 41 (2000).
176. Christina Duffy Bumett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic: The
Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE,
supra note 97, at 1, 30 n.1 (citing GAO, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. INSULAR AREAS: APPLICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997)).
See generally STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, THE LAW OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND AFFILIATED
JURISDICTIONS (1995). This population figure does not include the more than two million Puerto Ricans
who live on the mainland and are entitled to the full protection of U.S. citizenship. See Rivera Ramos,
supra note 26, at 232.
177. BtURNETT & MARSHALL, supra note 97, at 1-2. It should be noted that before Congress en-
acted the Jones Act, which conferred citizenship (but not representation in Congress) on Puerto Ricans
in 1917, a statement by the Puerto Rican House of Delegates was read into the Congressional Record. It
says, in part, "We firmly and loyally maintain our opposition to being declared, in defiance of our ex-
press wish or without our express consent, citizens of any country whatsoever other than our own be-
loved soil that God has given us as an inalienable gift and incoercible right." 51 CONG. REC. 6718-20
(1914), quoted in AlTon Guevara, Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Colonialism, 26 REv. JUR. U.P.R.
275, 279 n.27 (1992). For a thorough analysis of Puerto Rican citizenship, see Ediberto Roman, The
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v. Bidwell to deny U.S. citizenship to persons who were born in the Philippines
between 1898 and 1946, while it was a U.S. territory. 78 According to the
Court, during this period Filipinos were "wards" of the United States, "nation-
als" who owed allegiance to the United States but were not entitled to the full
benefits of citizenship.179 Because of the economic dependence, as well as the
social ties, created by U.S. colonization, many Filipinos have tried to immigrate
to the United States, but they are given no special consideration. As a result of
this exercise of plenary power, Filipinos who now apply to immigrate as imme-
diate family members of U.S. citizens or permanent residents have to wait
longer than any people from any other country.' 
80
The plenary power doctrine is also used to justify the political limbo in
which Puerto Rico remains. In 1898 Puerto Ricans had their own parliament,
full Spanish citizenship, and political representation in the Spanish parlia-
ment.181 After more than a century of U.S. rule, they have no representation in
Congress and only qualified U.S. citizenship. Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting in
Downes, said the majority's position was that "if an organized and settled
province of another sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has
the power to keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of am-
biguous existence for an indefinite period."' 182 This is exactly what has hap-
pened and Puerto Rico is still held in "an intermediate state of ambiguous ex-
istence" with no promise that Congress will ever allow it to determine its
future.183 Burnett and Marshall state,
The unincorporated territories were denied even the promise of any final status, ei-
ther within the constitutional framework or outside of it. They were subjected not
only to an unequal condition but to absolute uncertainty concerning their ultimate
status-uncertainty about who they were, where they belonged, and what their fu-
Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1(1998).
178. Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1024 (1998) (re-
lying on the Insular Cases as "authoritative guidance on the territorial scope of the term 'the United
States' in the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994).
179. Avelino J. Halagao, Jr., Citizens Denied: A Critical Examination of the Rabang Decision
Rejecting United States Citizenship Claims by Persons Born in the Philippines During the Territorial
Period, 5 ASIAN PAC. Am. L.J. 77, 77-78 (1998). For the statutory definition of "national," see 8 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(22) (1994).
180. According to the State Department, as of February 2002, the wait for Filipino spouses of per-
manent residents (and their unmarried children under twenty-one) was five years, nine months. For un-
married children over twenty-one, it was eight years, seven months. Ironically, it is harder for U.S. citi-
zens to bring in children over twenty-one, the wait being about thirteen years; for siblings, it is over
twenty-two years. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin, No. 41, Vol.
VII (2002), available at http://www.travel.state.gov/visabulletin.html.
181. They had had this political representation for over thirty years. Trias Monge, supra note 102,
at 6-7.
182. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 372 (1901).
183. In the referenda held on the status of Puerto Rico in 1952, 1967, and 1993, offering choices of
statehood, independence, or commonwealth status, the latter has prevailed. Roman, supra note 177, at
39. However, because the referenda were non-binding, they have been boycotted by many who support
Puerto Rican independence. In 1998 the referendum included a "none of the above" option which won
an absolute majority of 50.3%. Trias Monge, supra note 102, at 18-19.
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ture held. 18
4
As recently as 1996, the House Committee on Resources noted that the
"compact" currently governing U.S.-Puerto Rico relations does not meet the
United Nations's standards for self-government, that Puerto Rico is still an un-
incorporated U.S. territory, and that Congress can unilaterally revoke local self-
government and U.S. citizenship as long as it meets the "fundamental rights
test" of the Insular cases.1 85 Another consequence of this status is that the
United States military occupies a significant proportion of Puerto Rico and
continues, among other things, to engage in the very controversial bombing of
Vieques Island.
186
Economic exploitation is another on-going consequence of the exercise of
plenary power over U.S. "territories." In 1941, John Gunther wrote of his visit
to Puerto Rico:
I saw rickety squatter houses perched in garbage-drenched mud ... villages dirtier
than any I ever saw in the most squalid parts of China ... I saw, in short, misery,
disease, squalor, filth.... It would be shocking enough in the remote uplands of
Peru or the stinking valleys of the Ganges. But to see it on American territory,
among people whom the United States has governed since 1898, in a region for
which our federal responsibility has been complete for 43 years, is a paralyzingjolt ....187
Currently, more than 60 percent of Puerto Rican families live below the
poverty level, slightly less than in 1940. The annual per capita income is one-
third of that in the U.S., and welfare benefits are significantly lower than in the
U.S., as illustrated by a 1999 supplemental income cap of $32 per month, com-
pared with a mainland cap of $368 per month.188
Poverty has led to economic exploitation in U.S.-held territories. Unregu-
lated by U.S. labor laws, corporations can manufacture goods in sweatshops
and produce goods which can be imported with tariffs much lower than on
"foreign" goods and still bear the "made in U.S.A." label. 189 Christina Duffy
Burnett says,
184. BURNETT & MARSHALL, supra note 97, at 12.
185. Trias Monge, supra note 102, at 16 (citing House Comm. on Resources, Report 104-713, part
I, United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act, to Accompany H.R. 3024, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1996)). The locus of congressional authority on this question suggests that the govemment sees Puerto
Rico as little more than another resource to be exploited.
186. See Raymond Hemandez, A Tiny Island, But a Cause So Celebre: From New York to Holly-
wood-Vieques Has Issues for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001.
187. John Gunther, Inside Latin America (1941), at 423 quoted in Cabranes, supra note 101, at
44-45; see also PEDRO A. CABAN, CONSTRUCTING A COLONIAL PEOPLE: PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1898-1932, at 250-54 (1999).
188. Trias Monge, supra note 102, at 19.
189. See William Branigin, Top Clothing Retailers Labeled Labor Abusers; Sweatshops Allegedly
Run on U.S. Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at A14. See generally Deborah J. Karet, The Com-
monwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Gar-
ment Industry?, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 1047 (2000).
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The people of the United States... continue to be complicitous in a vestigial colo-
nialism .... The United States continues to exercise sovereignty over people (now
its own citizens) denied equal membership in the Union; the colonial system that
many warned would betray the nation's commitment to freedom and equality en-
dures. 
190
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF INTRACONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS
"Mounting an attack on the plenary power doctrine may be the top legal priority for
Indian tribes today. A victory over the doctrine may become the 'Brown v. Board of
Education' of Indian rights. ' Elimination of the doctrine and a repudiation of the
onerous aspects of Lone Wolf would establish the reality of the government-to-
government relationship officially launched in the 1980s between the United States
and tribes.
191
This statement by Blue Clark conflates-unintentionally, I expect-the two
directions in which the law could move upon rejection of the plenary power
doctrine. The first is the direction of Brown,192 a move to incorporate and as-
similate those Others over whom plenary power is currently exercised into the
mainstream of U.S. jurisprudence and to apply more fully the constitutional
protections available to "insider" U.S. citizens. The second direction, making
"govemment-to-government" relations a reality, is quite different. For that to
happen-something not actually envisioned by U.S. Indian policy of the
1980s193-U.S. lawmakers would have to recognize and apply principles of
international law. This section considers some of the shortcomings of the "in-
.. . 194
traconstitutional" or assimilationist option.
190. BURNETr & MARSHALL, supra note 97, at xiv. Estimates are that between one-third and one-
half of all Puerto Rican women have been sterilized as a result of U.S. policies. See CHURCHILL, supra
note 171, at 377.
191. CLARK, supra note 79, at 109-10 (citing George Grossman, Indians and the Law, in NEw
DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY 112 (Colin G. Calloway ed., 1988)).
192. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning implicitly Plessy v. Ferguson and
holding that segregated public schools are inherently unequal).
193. See David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government as
Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 223 (2001). See generally VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E.
WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS (1999); RECENT LEGAL ISSUES FOR
AMERICAN INDIANS, 1968 TO THE PRESENT (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
194. I use the term "assimilation" to refer both to the jurisprudential incorporation of these areas of
law into the constitutional framework and to the broader social incorporation of those deemed Other
into the American polity. In the latter context, George Martinez identifies three principle elements of
assimilation: (1) abiding by dominant norms or a core culture, (2) rejecting race consciousness, and (3)
repudiating the equal value of cultures. George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A
Philosophical Perspective, 20 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 6 (1999).
While these requirements are placed on the Other, meeting them is necessary but not sufficient. As-
similation also requires a concomitant acceptance of the Other by the dominant society. This is illus-
trated by the language of the Chinese exclusion cases and the Japanese American internment cases,
which both referenced the "refusal" of these groups to assimilate to a society which had persistently
excluded them. See, e.g., United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 237 n.4 (1944) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1888). For a more encompassing explanation of the
"doctrines of assimilation" through which "non-European peoples [were] brought within the realm of
international law," see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nine-
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In a powerful critique of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law,
Hiroshi Motomura argues that courts have used "phantom" constitutional
norms in "subconstitutional," i.e., statutory and regulatory, decisions to gradu-
ally introduce constitutional constraints into immigration decisions which for-
mally fall under the plenary power doctrine. Such cases illustrate, he says, that
decisionmakers realize the inadequacy of the plenary power doctrine and are
moving toward the full constitutionalization of immigration law.195 While con-
stitutionalization would lead to better results in many cases, 196 this solution
raises two fundamental questions. First, is assimilation actually the best solu-
tion? And second, is the constitutional order actually capable of incorporating
the Other within U.S. law? While the answers will be different in each field of
law, there are common limitations to the intraconstitutional option that should
be considered.
First, an intraconstitutional approach presumes away the rights of those
who are subject to plenary authority to decide for themselves the nature of their
affiliation with the United States, a right firmly rooted in international law. This
is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rice v. Cayetano,
where the Court used a race-based equal protection analysis to strike down a
rule that only those of native Hawaiian descent were eligible to vote for the
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (thereby opening the vote to white
settlers). 197 Chris lijima notes that although the "colonization of native people
is wrapped and justified in the rhetoric and the ideology of white suprem-
acy,"' 198 the Supreme Court's application of a standard equal protection analysis
was inappropriate:
The inquiry should not be whether Native Hawaiians constitute a "race".... [but]
whether they have been specifically harmed as a people by the loss of their nation-
hood.
It is not acceptable to confuse the remedy for loss of nationhood with the rem-
edy for the denial of equal access to political, social, and economic power de-
manded by other subordinated groups within America.... [T]here can be no "cure"
without proper diagnosis.'
9 9
Similarly, equal protection within the polity is not a remedy for the United
States's disregard of American Indian sovereignty. Indian nations have consis-
tently rejected the U.S. government's attempts to force them into the polity and
teenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 35-57 (1999).
195. See Motomura, supra note 10, at 549-50.
196. See generally Comment, supra note 160 (advocating the "constitutionalization" of federal
Indian law).
197. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (rejecting the proposition, based on Morton v. Man-
cari, that this was a political rather than racial distinction). See generally Gavin Clarkson, Recent De-
velopments: Not Because They Are Brown, But Because of EA: Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000),
24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 921 (2001).
198. lijima, supra note 99, at 120-21.
199. Id. at 123-24.
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have fought instead for independence and the enforcement of treaties. Under
international law, the United States's claims to incorporate Indian lands and
peoples have no more legitimacy than Germany's claims to Luxembourg or the
Netherlands in the early 1940s.200 This debate is directly tied to the well-being
of the people involved. The disastrous consequences of assimilationist policies
can be seen throughout the history of colonial rule and in contemporary Indian
communities, from the genocidal impact of European diseases and attempts to
"Christianize" Indians, to the loss of land and community following the Allot-
ment Act, 2° 1 to the multi-generational trauma inflicted by boarding schools
whose stated purpose was to "kill the Indian and save the. man," to the urban
resettlement programs of the 1950s and 1960s, which left large numbers of
202people homeless and unemployed.
The devastation faced by indigenous communities is presumably a "worst
case" scenario for assimilationist policies. However, it is commonly assumed
that the problems of indigenous peoples, or those living in U.S. territories or
subject to harsh immigration policies, are best solved by their full incorporation
into the constitutional framework and, indeed, many are willing to give up
203
claims to sovereignty or self-determination in exchange for equal protection.
The inadequacies of this option may be better assessed by considering what
should be the "best case" scenario, the extension of full constitutional protec-
tion to African Americans.
While the plenary power doctrine as articulated in the 1890s was never
formally applied to Africans in America, they were subject to the plenary
authority of European individuals and their various governments beginning in
1619.204 Without using the words "slave" or "slavery" the Constitution ensured
that the slave trade could not be banned before 1808, that even jurisdictions
that forbade slavery would use their police powers to return fugitive slaves, and
200. See ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF
DICTATORSHIP, at xiii (1941) (defining such conduct as characteristic of what he terms a "prerogative
state").
201. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85, 151-55, 169-74.
202. See James A. Casey, Sovereignty By Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal Sovereignty,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 412 (1994) ("I[T]he assimilationist policies of the federal government were
disastrous for Indian peoples."); Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Fail-
ure of the 1920s Native American Irrigation and Assimilation Policies, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(1997).
203. See, e.g., JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985). Judge Torruella, the first Puerto Rican appointed to any federal court
of appeals, sees Puerto Rico's current status as "separate and unequal" on "a par with Plessy v.
Ferguson," and advocates elevation to full equality through statehood. See also Jose A. Cabranes,
Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 450 (1986) (book review)
(summarizing Torruella's arguments).
204. See generally LERONE BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK
AMERICA (6th ed. 1987); and IVAN VAN SERTIMA, THEY CAME BEFORE COLUMBUS (1976), for back-
ground on pre-European contact by Africans.
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that the militia would be available to suppress slave uprisings.20 5 These provi-
sions, without which the Union would not have been formed, prompted Wil-
liam Lloyd Garrison to call the Constitution "a covenant with death, and an
agreement with hell. 20 6 The law of slavery that evolved in America treated
slaves as property, classified persons with any discernible African ancestry as
"black," presumed black persons to be slaves, and used the power of the federal
government to protect this "property" everywhere under its jurisdiction.207
Justice Taney articulated this plenary authority most clearly in 1857 in Dred
Scott v. Sanford.2 °8 Dred Scott sued his nominal owner in federal court arguing,
among other things, that the time he had spent in territory where slavery was
forbidden by the Missouri Compromise rendered him a free man. Taney held
that the federal court had no diversity jurisdiction because Scott was not a citi-
zen of Missouri, asserting that black people were not citizens of the United
States or, therefore, of any particular state, nor even "persons" under the law.
209
He then described all those of African descent as "regarded as beings of an in-
ferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in so-
cial or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect." 210 Taney concluded by declaring the Mis-
souri Compromise unconstitutional on the ground that Congress could not pass
a law barring citizens from taking property into U.S. territories. 211 Thus, until
the end of the Civil War, the legal system supported the exercise by white per-
sons generally, and state governments particularly, of complete plenary author-
ity over black people.
212
The legal framework changed dramatically with enactment of the Thir-
205. See U.S. CONST. art. H1, § 8, cl. 15; id. § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see also PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996);
Staughton Lynd, Slavery and the Founding Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY: A REAPPRAISAL 115 (Melvin
Drimmer ed., 1968).
206. Paul Finkelman, A Covenant with Death: Slavery and the Constitution, AMERICAN VISIONS,
May-June 1986, at 21; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 73.
207. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free": Free Blacks in
Colonial andAntebellum Virginia, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (1991).
208. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
209. Id. at 407; see Simeon C.R. Mcintosh, Reading Dred Scott, Plessy and Brown: Toward a
Constitutional Hermeneutics, 38 How. L.J. 53, 65-67 (1994).
210. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. This is a crude version of the principle articulated in Nishimura
Ekiu that an immigrant is due only such process as Congress says is due. See supra text accompanying
notes 43-45.
211. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. Interestingly, this is what Justice Brown relies on in Downes v.
Bidwell as an example of how the Courts will step in if Congress oversteps its bounds in exercising its
plenary authority over territorial possessions. See infra note 114.
212. 1 use the terms "white" and "black" to refer not to "races," which I consider illegitimate social
constructs, but to the classifications created by domestic law to promote and reinforce slavery and racial
hierarchy in the United States. See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994); Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted
Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry L. Gates
ed., 1985).
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teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment
abolished legalized slavery except as punishment for those convicted of crimes.
Many southern legislatures responded by passing laws which criminalized idle-
ness or vagrancy, and many emancipated, but destitute, African Americans
found themselves convicts leased to their former "masters," doing the same
work on the same land for no pay.213 The legal system was used to enforce their
subordination in numerous ways, leading Justice Miller to comment in the
Slaughter-House Cases that the "black codes" passed by southern states after
abolition "imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent
that their freedom was of little value. 2 14
These developments were paralleled in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which declared all persons of African descent born in the U.S. to
be citizens of both the United States and the state in which they lived, and for-
bade state governments from discriminating against them. Euroamerican law-
makers and policymakers, even avid abolitionists, had not expected that per-
sons of African descent would become full U.S. citizens, 215 and in response to
the amendment they reformulated the legal apparatus in ways that resulted in
216the social, political, and economic subordination of African Americans. This
set the stage for a two-track process in which a stated commitment to formal
legal equality ran parallel to legally-sanctioned, race-based subordination, be-
ginning with a series of cases in which the Supreme Court refused to apply the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to non-governmental
conduct and "left [the African American] segment of American society virtu-
ally unprotected against state actions. 21 7
213. See generally MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928 (1996); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN
FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
214. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873).
215. See Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate (1858), reproduced in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN PREJUDICE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS ON RACE FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO DAVID
DUKE 286-90 (S.T. Joshi ed., 1999). See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:
AMERICAN ATrITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968).
216. In Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1898), Indians were not only Other by virtue of "race" but
were non-citizens; however, the Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), passed just three years later, and
the subsequent Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2001), unilaterally imposed citizen-
ship on Indians. If the purpose of these laws, generally speaking, was to consolidate settler state control
over those it wished to colonize internally, this could simply reflect a tactical shift from the politics of
exclusion ("we don't owe you any protection because you belong to another sovereign") to those of in-
clusion ("we have declared you to be one of ours, so you are now bound by our laws"), a shift to an as-
similationist model of subordination parallel to that reflected in the post-Reconstruction civil rights
cases such as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). This seems to be something akin to what was
happening when Congress granted a peculiarly limited kind of citizenship to Puerto Ricans. In all of
these ways, the citizenship debate is inextricable from the issue of the assertion of plenary power.
217. CLARK, supra note 79, at 11; see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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The Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade states from interfering with the
right to vote, was similarly undermined. In many disfranchisement cases the
Court refused to reach the merits; in others, the Court interpreted the Fifteenth
Amendment narrowly, allowing facially neutral legislation adopted for a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose, extensive discretion for voter registrars, and
218race-based interventions by private individuals. In one case, Giles v. Harris,
the Court "candidly conceded that even if southern disfranchisement devices
were unconstitutional, [it] was powerless to provide adequate remedies." 2 19
By 1896 most of the gains African Americans had made during Recon-
struction had been rolled back and Jim Crow legislation was becoming com-
monplace. 2 The Supreme Court cemented this reversion in Plessy v.
Ferguson,221 in an opinion written by Justice Brown, soon to be the author of
Downes v. Bidwell. 222 Brown wrote that consigning Homer Plessy, admittedly
"seven eighths Caucasian," to a "colored" railroad car was not a "badge of ser-
vitude" violating the Thirteenth Amendment, nor a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection.223 Plessy was not about the segregation of public
accommodations so much as the "broader question of constitutive rhetoric and
collective identity: who belongs to the American polity and on what condi-
tions? '224 Even Justice Harlan's dissent, well-known for its assertion that the
Constitution is "color-blind," argued that compliance with the Constitution was
the best way to maintain white supremacy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it
will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast
to the principles of constitutional liberty.
225
Plessy spawned a rash of segregationist legislation which eventually ex-
tended "'to every type of transportation, education, and amusement; to public
housing, restaurants, hotels, libraries, public parks and recreational facilities,
218. Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303.
219. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). KLARMAN, supra note 218, at 304. See also, LOFGREN, supra note 54,
at 203.
220. On the gains, see W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 670-710 (1976); on
the rollbacks, see DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 40-43 (3d ed. 1992). See gener-
ally LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979).
221. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
222. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
223. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-2.
224. McIntosh, supra note 209, at 67.
225. 163 U.S. at 559; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 116. In the same dissent, Harlan
dismissed the Chinese entirely as an unassimilable race. 163 U.S. at 561. See generally Gabriel J. Chin,
The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1996) (putting the
Plessy dissent into the context of Justice Harlan's decisions in the Chinese exclusion and citizenship
cases). Charles Lofgren says, "The justices had not gone so far as to hold explicitly that the Constitution
recognized two categories of citizenship, one for whites and the other for non-whites, analogous to the
stance it soon would take toward the inhabitants of the new territories acquired in the imperialist binge
at the end of the decade." LOFGREN, supra note 54, at 201.
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fraternal associations, marriage, employment, and public welfare institu-
tions. 226 Judge Higginbotham wrote:
In the post-Reconstruction era, legislatures and courts disingenuously affixed labels
to their enactments and pronouncements that suggested compliance with the Four-
teenth Amendment's requirements: labels such as "equal protection," "due proc-
ess," and "privileges and immunities." Nevertheless, their conduct, rulings, and
declarations were most often associated with black inferiority and powerlessness.
227
This highlights the real significance of Jim Crow laws, which was not the fur-
therance of segregation per se but the perpetuation of white supremacy: Jim
Crow was enacted in the midst of efforts to disenfranchise black voters and in
an era when an average of two African Americans were "lynched by mobs-
burned, hanged, mutilated" every week.228
Judge Higginbotham's "Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence"
begins with the precept "Inferiority: Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the
ideal of the superiority of whites and the inferiority of blacks" and ends with
"By Any Means Possible: Support all measures, including the use of violence,
that maximize the profitability of slavery and that legitimize racism. Oppose, by
the use of violence if necessary, all measures that advocate the abolition of
slavery or the diminution of white supremacy., 229 As he said, "[i]t would be a
mistake of the highest order to perceive these ten precepts as concepts that per-
ished at the end of the Civil War or upon the passage of the Thirteenth, Four-
,230teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments." Similarly, these precepts did not perish
when the Supreme Court overturned Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education
231
or when Congress passed the civil rights acts of the 1960s.
232
Brown introduced an era of equal protection jurisprudence that recognized
the inherently subordinating nature of legally segregated public accommoda-
tions and institutions, but it did little to address the social, economic, or politi-
cal realities of a people who had been stripped of their national identities but
still suffered from a form of internal colonialism.233 Although it has been nearly
fifty years since the Brown decision, for the most part public schools remain
segregated.23 Nearly thirty percent of African Americans have incomes below
226. Id. at 202 (quoting 1950 study).
227. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 83.
228. ZINN, supra note 28, at 308 (citing the average for 1899-1903). See generally LEON F.
LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CRoW (1998).
229. HIGGINBOTHAM supra note 1, at 195-96.
230. Id. at 204.
231. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
232. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1973bb (1994).
233. On the failures of equality jurisprudence, see Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv.
363 (1992).
234. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection of Plessy: The Supreme Court's Acquiescence in the
Resegregation of America's Schools, 9 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 1, 2 ("Despite the atmost
wholehearted public acceptance of Brown and the coinciding rejection of Plessy, the Burger and
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the official poverty line, with forty percent in actual poverty. Median black
household income is about two-thirds of that of white households and the dis-
parity is much greater when wealth, rather than income, is compared.235 Two-
thirds of all "non-white" men are arrested and jailed before they turn thirty, and
they are three-and-one-half times more likely than their white counterparts to be
convicted of felonies.236
The Brown decision is often portrayed as diametrically opposed to Plessy,
but they have both served the same end-incorporating persons of African de-
scent into the American polity without fundamentally changing economic or
237political structures. Brown eschewed separatism as inherently unequal. How-
ever, by emphasizing the need to assimilate black children into white society it
reinforced a primary tenet of white supremacy: "white" is the norm to which
others must assimilate and by which they will be measured. As Jerome Culp
says, Brown assumed that "assimilation and cultural degradation were the only
two courses available., 238 He summarizes the inadequacies of the equal protec-
tion framework:
[Brown's] failures stem from three common misconceptions .... The most impor-
tant misconception was that if we changed the law of the land, "good" people would
comply with it. However, preventing those "good" people from using ruses to
achieve their cherished ends served by racial segregation has proven difficult ....
The second misconception is that there is a race neutral policy that we can all
Rehnquist Courts have acquiesced in the continuance of Plessy-like racially separate educational facili-
ties by restricting the desegregation remedies available to lower courts and school boards ...." (foot-
note omitted)); see also Bradley W. Joondeph, A Second Redemption?, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 169
(1999) (reviewing GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWV V. BOARD OF EDUCAToN (1996)).
235. Clarence Lusane, Persisting Disparities: Globalization and the Economic Status of African
Americans, 42 How. L.J. 431, 434-35 (1999).
236. JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1996); see also MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE
118-41 (1999).
237. The connection is illustrated by Justice Harlan's famous "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind"
dissent in Plessy, which has been used from Brown through the recent decisions of the Rehnquist Court.
See Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("At least where state or
local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and
limb ... can justify an exception to the principle.., that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind."); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from holding
that minority contractor set-aside was constitutionally permissible). (The majority's position was re-
ceded from in Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and considered overruled in Doe v. Univ. ofIll.,
138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).) See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44
STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991) (listing cases referencing this assertion).
For Justice Harlan, there was no discontinuity between that assertion, his affirmation of the domi-
nance of the white race, and his critique of the statute at issue on the grounds that it allowed "a China-
man," someone of "a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to be-
come citizens of the United States," to "ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens ... while
citizens of the black race" could not. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561, see Chin, supra note 225, at 156.
238. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown
Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 678 (1995). For an extensive critique of attempts to use the law to
assimilate Latinos, see Martinez, supra note 194 (comparing the dominant society's demands for as-
similation to those of the "resistance-is-futile" Borg species on Star Trek).
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agree on that will achieve racial justice ....
The final misconception at the heart of the Brown decision is that a single stan-
dard of assimilation can be articulated for American society, and that black people
will be willing to adhere to that standard. This requirement of black assimilation is
akin to a requirement that black people put on white face and is ultimately unac-
ceptable as a goal for a decolonized African American community.
The experience of African Americans illustrates that equal protection under
law is necessary for the protection of human rights, but is not sufficient. The
limits to an intraconstitutional solution to problems created by the U.S. gov-
ernment's exercise of plenary power are summarized by the statements of two
great African American leaders, quoted by Judge Higginbotham in Shades of
Freedom. In 1852 Frederick Douglass said,
This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice I must mourn .... The
blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not enjoyed in common. The rich in-
heritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fa-
thers, is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and healing to
you, has brought stripes and death to me.
And 140 years later, on July 4, 1992, Justice Thurgood Marshall said,
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant memories... and that
liberty and equality were just around the bend .... But as I look around, I see not a
nation of unity but of division-Afro and white, indigenous and immigrant, rich
and poor educated and illiterate .... [T]here is a price to be paid for division and
isolation. N
The African American experience, paralleled in many respects by other
"minorities" in the United States, and the terrible price paid by indigenous peo-
242ples for attempts to assimilate them illustrate the limitations of an intracon-
stitutional solution to problems caused by the government's exercise of plenary243
power. The following section considers a "metaconstitutional" option which
239. Culp, supra note 238, at 669-70; see also Spencer A. Overton, The Threat Diversity Poses to
African Americans: A Black Nationalist Critique of Outsider Ideology, 37 How. L.J. 465 (1994) (con-
cluding that diversity could promote majoritarian control).
240. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, illus. following 128.
241. Id., illus. preceeding 129.
242. These problems are also reflected in other settler societies. See generally ANDREW ARMITAGE,
COMPARING THE POLICY OF ABORIGINAL ASSIMILATION: AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND
(1995); GEOFFREY YORK, THE DISPOSSESSED: LIFE AND DEATH IN NATIVE CANADA (1990).
243. This thesis is supported by Jack Chin's exposition of the notion that even had the Supreme
Court been making its immigration decisions within a constitutional framework, it would have reached
essentially the same results that it did using the plenary power doctrine. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race
and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000) (generally agreeing with Chin's thesis, but arguing that immigration law is
particularly vulnerable to improper racial bias); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism:
Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (2000) (proposing
some qualifications, but generally agreeing with Chin's thesis).
As long as U.S. policy is driven by colonial imperatives to acquire more land, labor, or resources,
assimilation cannot be considered a viable option. Such imperatives will cease to exist only through the
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incorporates international law, an alternative that has much to offer people of
African descent in the U.S. as well as those formally subjected to the plenary
power doctrine.
V. INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO
A "METACONSTITUTIONAL" JURISPRUDENCE
Human rights is the idea of our time. It asserts that every human being, in every so-
ciety, is entitled to have basic autonomy and freedoms respected and basic needs
satisfied .... The society has corresponding duties to give effect to these rights
through domestic laws and institutions.
Today the human rights idea is universal, accepted by virtually all states and
societies regardless of historical, cultural, ideological, economic, or other differ-
ences. It is international, the subject of international diplomacy, law, and institu-
tions ....
The universalization of human rights is a political fact.
244
Judge Higginbotham said, that "more than a century ago, Justice Holmes
suggested that the law was a seamless web, 24 5 to explain the interrelatedness of
his precepts of slavery jurisprudence and, in a broader sense, to argue that
American law cannot be understood without studying the law of slavery and
racial subordination. Similarly, the plenary power doctrine is not peripheral to
the law, but is the cornerstone of American jurisprudence concerning those
deemed Other in a more complex way than "race" alone. As such, it, too, must
246be seen as an integral part of this seamless web. American law is generally
defined by the parameters of the Constitution, making the exercise of plenary
power as discussed in this Article aberrational with respect to "real," i.e., intra-
constitutional, law.247 However, American jurisprudence comprises both intra-
constitutional law and the extraconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction under the
plenary power doctrine, for American law accompanies U.S. jurisdiction-the
recognition of real self-determination for all peoples, at which point the issue will be framed as volun-
tary co-operative relationships between peoples, not the assimilation of one group into another. See
generally WARD CHURCHILL, I Am Indigenist: Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth World, in FROM A
NATIVE SON: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INDIGENISM, 1985-1995, at 509-46 (1996).
244. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 205 (quoting Louis Henkin).
245. Id. at 172.
246. Felix Cohen said, "Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other
minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith." FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW V (Rennard Strickland et al., eds., 1982). The truth of this observation again becomes ap-
parent as plenary power, with its accompanying disregard for basic human rights, is extended to a
shifting configuration of Others. Thus, in immigration law, legal principles designed to exclude the
Chinese are used against Europeans accused of being "communists" and Muslims presumed to be "ter-
rorists," and what was conceived on the basis of race can be applied on the basis of national origin, re-
ligion, culture, political belief, or any other signifier of outsider status. See supra notes 123-133, 143-
48.
247. While one could see the exercise of the plenary power as "intraconstitutional" because it has
been deemed consistent with the Constitution, the point is to incorporate law that provides protections
not afforded within this constitutional framework.
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law has followed the flag, even if the Constitution has not. Since the Constitu-
tion was not designed to and does not, in fact, protect all persons within the ju-
248
risdiction of U.S. courts, we must acknowledge that the United States has
obligations to those persons under international law and envision a "metacon-
stitutional" American jurisprudence that incorporates international law.
249
The Other against whom plenary power is exercised often consists of peo-
ple identified as non-white. However, its primary function is not promotion of
racial hierarchy per se; however, the maintenance of colonial structures and re-
lationships, which provide access to land, labor and natural resources. 25 Within
this sphere of plenary power, constitutional rights are not being protected, nor
is the global rule of law adhered to, despite the Constitution's specific directive
that treaties are part of the supreme law of the land. In fact, it appears that the
plenary power doctrine is invoked precisely to avoid otherwise applicable law,
domestic and international.
252
SThe United States has either refused to ratify core human rights treaties or
253done so subject to significant reservations. Those who turn to the courts for
relief under the treaties that do bind the United States have been confronted
with judicially-created doctrines that the courts invoke to disregard treaty obli-
gations-not only the plenary power doctrine but also the "last-in-time" rule
under which the courts enforce later-enacted federal statutes even if they result
in treaty violations 254; the courts' refusal to enforce those treaties or treaty pro-
visions deemed "non-self-executing"2 55; and courts' deference to Congress and
248. See infra text accompanying notes 40-49, 74-84, 111-117.
249. In advocating the incorporation of international law, I do so with the recognition that it is
limited because all of its foundational principles are rooted in the European legal tradition, and it fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the relations between sovereign "states" to the exclusion of the indigenous
nations upon whose land and people those states are built. For an excellent exposition of the centrality
of the colonial confrontation to contemporary international law, see Antony Anghie, Finding the Pe-
ripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1 (1999). See also Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42
HARv. INT'L L.J. 201 (2001) (exposing the rhetoric underlying the human rights movement). On the
relationship between nations and states, see supra note 5.
250. The integral relationship Antony Anghie has articulated between colonialism and the devel-
opment of international law, see Anghie, supra note 194, finds parallel in the relationship between co-
lonialism and the plenary power doctrine in U.S. law.
251. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
252. This pattern is clearly seen in the United States's recent attempts to rationalize its treatment of
Afghans and others allegedly affiliated with al Qaeda being held without charge in open air cages on the
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba by asserting that neither constitutional protections nor the laws of
war apply. See Carol Rosenberg, In Limbo: Detainees Await the Next Step, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17,
2002, at 20A ("[The al Qaeda and Taliban captives] are men without countries from a war that has
never been declared. They are prisoners defined as detainees, caged up by the U.S. military on a slice of
territory that is technically not American soil.").
253. See infra notes 270-277, 287-290, 292-295, 301-305.
254. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (enforcing a later-enacted law exempting
Hawaiian sugar from duty despite its conflict with an earlier treaty with the Dominican Republic);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1987).
255. See, e.g., Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (declaring that treaties
in the nature of a contract to perform a particular act require legislation before the courts will enforce
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the executive on "political questions."
256
The combined result of such doctrines is that those injured by violations of
international law are thus left in the position described so eloquently by Justice
Jackson, dissenting in Mezei: they are free to leave Ellis Island "in any direc-
tion except west; that might mean freedom, if only [they were] amphib-
ian[s]. ' 257 Even Justices White and Brown, writing for the majority in Downes,
stated that everyone has some fundamental or "natural" rights, but the Supreme
Court has never identified the law that protects such rights. International law
provides just such protections and its enforcement would prevent many of the
injustices currently suffered by immigrants, Indians, and those in external colo-
nies under the plenary power doctrine, and would dramatically improve the
situation of African Americans and other minority groups in the U.S., as illus-
trated by the examples that follow.
Current interpretation and enforcement of U.S. immigration law violates
international law in numerous ways, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
pointed out in Rodriguez-Fernandez.58 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaims a right to freedom of movement, with specific protections for
persons seeking asylum from persecution. 9 The rights of asylum seekers are
spelled out in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Proto-
260col, to which the U.S. is a party. International norms are also violated by the
U.S.'s arbitrary and indefinite detention of persons, including juveniles, and by
current immigration restrictions relating to HIV/AIDS. 26 1 These problems are
compounded by provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act,262 which Jaya Ramji calls a "fearsome example of
them). It is difficult to tell which treaties will be declared non-self-executing. See, e.g., United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (finding the same treaty addressed in Foster & Elam to be
self-executing; both opinions were authored by Justice Marshall). Sometimes select provisions of trea-
ties will be determined to be self-executing or non-self-executing. See Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718,
242 P.2d 617 (1952) (refusing to find the non-discrimination provisions of the U.N. Charter self-
executing, but invalidating California's alien land laws on the basis of Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection).
256. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962) (stating that judicial deference to the
"political branches" of government is appropriate with respect to certain matters of foreign policy).
257. Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 220.
258. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-90; see supra notes 127-129; see
also Robert J. Williams, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council and Its Aftermath: A Problematic Gap in In-
ternational Immigration Law, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 55 (1995) (analyzing the Sale decision,
which refused to give extraterritorial jurisdiction to the Refugee Convention).
259. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, para 2, art. 14, para 1, G.A. Res. 217(AIH),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
260. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The U.S.
has neither signed nor ratified this treaty, but it is binding by virtue of the U.S. ratification of the Proto-
col Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (136 States parties; U.S. ratified
with two reservations).
261. Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of Interna-
tional Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REv. 589, 608-18 (1995).
262. IRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, division C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in various sections of
8 and 18 U.S.C.).
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how individual rights can be abridged in a country that fails to take its interna-
tional human rights obligations seriously."
263
The IIRIRA abrogates U.S. obligations under various treaties, including
264those contained in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
2651985 Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 266 Ramji states:
The IIRIRA breaches numerous individual rights and duties of states that arise from
these treaties, including the right to be free from arbitrary detention, the right to due
process of law, the duty of non-refoulement, the duty not to punish asylum seekers
who enter illegally, and the duty of good faith interpretation of treaties.
26 7
Ramji concludes, "Under current doctrine, there is no domestic remedy for vic-
tims of the United States' derogations from international standards. 26 8
The harshest consequences of U.S. immigration law and policy have thus
far been deemed constitutionally acceptable by the Supreme Court. They would
be eliminated, however, if the United States courts would enforce the treaties
identified above, as well as the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Con-
269 270sular Relations, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and various
271
applicable treaties of friendship and commerce or extradition. In the wake of
263. Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 117, 160 (2001).
264. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 260, incorporating the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 260.
265. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, G.A. Res.
46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/46 (1984). The U.S. ratified with
three reservations, one understanding, and one declaration, all of which qualify its commitments.
266. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The
U.S. ratified with five reservations, five understandings, four declarations, and one proviso. The U.S. is
not a party to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.
Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), nor to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex Supp.
No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
267. Ramji, supra note 263, at 118. The United States is a party to each of these conventions.
268. Id. See generally Meredith K. Olafson, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immi-
gration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433 (1999) (arguing that the plenary
power doctrine does not comport with contemporary public international law).
269. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. These have particular significance in
the human rights arena because they require particular protections for non-citizens which are frequently
ignored by the United States. See Shana F. Marbury, Breard v. Greene. International Human Rights
and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 505 (1999) (discussing
the U.S. execution of a Paraguayan national in spite of a request for a stay from the International Court
of Justice).
270. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex,
Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). The United States and Somalia, which has not had a
functioning government, are the only countries which are not parties to this treaty.
271. The problem is illustrated by United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (hold-
ing that the abduction of a Mexican citizen by U.S. agents did not violate U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty of May 4, 1978 [1979], because the treaty, while providing avenues for extradition, did not ex-
plicitly forbid abduction). See generally Royal J. Stark, The Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine: Interna-
tional Law, Due Process, and United States Sponsored Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals Abroad, 9
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the indefinite and unexplained detention of unidentified persons since Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons272 should be added to the list as well.
The harms that result from the assertion that Puerto Rico and other "unin-
corporated territories" are not colonies but "freely associated" with the United
States are best remedied through international law as well. The right of nations
to "self-determination" is one the United States has advocated since World War
273 274I. It is a foundational principle of the Charter of the United Nations, fea-
tured prominently in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)275 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR),276 and recognized as a customary norm of international law,
277perhaps even ajus cogens norm.
In defining "self-determination," James Anaya references "a universe of
human rights precepts concerned broadly with peoples, including indigenous
peoples, and grounded in the idea that all are equally entitled to control their
own destinies. Self-determination gives rise to remedies that tear at the legacies
of empire, discrimination, suppression of democratic participation, and cultural
suffocation. '" 278 According to Efren Rivera Ramos:
The conceptual scheme of the Insular Cases is entirely incompatible with any notion
of self-determination... [which] at a minimum... implies the right ... of a peo-
ple.., to determine its own status and associations with other peoples or groups
CONN. J. INT'L L. 113 (1993).
272. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1529 (entered into force Mar. 28, 1996). The United States is not a party to this treaty, nor to the
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July
18, 1978); the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (entered into force
Nov. 16, 1999); the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty Series
No. 67 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987); or the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Pun-
ishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into force Mar. 5,
1995).
273. See Woodrow Wilson, "The Fourteen Points Address" Address to a joint session of Congress
(1918), reprinted in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER: MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND
DOCUMENTS FROM THE BIBLE TO THE PRESENT 299-304 (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 1997).
274. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
275. ICCPR, supra note 266, art. 1 ("All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their ecoomic, social and cultural
development.").
276. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (providing the same rights as under article 1 of the ICCPR).
The United States, though instrumental in drafting both of these conventions, did not ratify the ICCPR
until 1992 and has signed but not ratified the ICESCR.
277. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1996); see Araujo, supra
note 5; Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 17-37 (James Crawford ed., 1988); Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship,
28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301 (1995); Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Coloniza-
tion of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1119, 1127-33 (1997) (explaining the principle of self-
determination).
278. Anaya, supra note 277, at 75.
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and to fashion for itself the organizing principles of its social existence. The logic of
the Court's discourse, however, presupposes the plenary power of the metropolitan
state to determine the political condition and the civil and political rights of the
people of the acquired territory.
2 7 9
He adds that it "is not anachronistic to level this critique against the Court's
political rationale," for even by the late 1800s and early 1900s, the notion of
280collective and, specifically, national self-determination was widely accepted.
In 1960, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514, the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, noted that "all
peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their
sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory" and proclaimed the
"necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its
•,, . 281
forms and manifestations. Among other things, the General Assembly de-
clared that "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations."
282
Since 1972, the U.N. Decolonization Committee and other international or-
ganizations have called for the decolonization of Puerto Rico, as have other
international organizations. 283 The United States maintains that Puerto Rico is
not a colony but a commonwealth, based on Public Law 600. 28 4 Enacted by
Congress in 1950, it declared a "compact" of free association between Puerto
Rico and the United States and gave Puerto Rico additional but limited powers
285
of self-government. However, the compact was unilaterally imposed upon
Puerto Rico and, as Aaron Guevara notes, the following are clear indicators of
Puerto Rico's colonial status: (1) lack of equality under the law; (2) inability to
vote in national elections; (3) lack of representation in Congress; (4) applica-
tion of the laws passed by Congress; (5) lack of ability to decide its future
status; and (6) economic dependence. 286 At a minimum, self-determination forPuerto Rico and each of the other "unincorporated" U.S. territories will require
279. Rivera Ramos, supra note 26, at 298.
280. Id. at 299.
281. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
282. Id.
283. Aaron Guevara, Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Colonialism, 26 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 275, 303-
04(1992).
284. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, 64 Stat. 319.
285. Roman, supra note 277, at 1151-61. In 1953, after Puerto Rico became a "commonwealth"
and elected a local government, the U.S. convinced the United Nations to take Puerto Rico off its list of
non-self-governing territories. G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., at 25, U.N. Doc A/PV.459
A/RES/758(vii) (1953). See Guevara, supra note 283, at 283-90.
286. Id. at 275 n.4. The relationship between the U.S. and Puerto Rico is defined in the Federal
Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1994). With respect to other U.S. territories, see generally ion M.
Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the Untied States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag
Islands, 14 U. HAw. L. REv. 445 (1992).
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real, not simply formal, recognition of the law that has emerged from the
United Nations since 1948 regarding the independence of colonies and "trust
territories."
Bringing "federal Indian law" into compliance with international law would
first require enforcing the treaties that exist between the United States and In-
dian nations and interpreting them in accordance with customary international
law and the principles articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.287 Siegfried Wiessner says,
The fact that treaties with Indian nations can be abrogated under Lone Wolf does
not stand in the way of their characterization as obligations under international law
.... Traditional international law scholarship, applied in intellectual honesty,
would have a hard time denying commitments arising from U.S.-Indian treaties the
effect of international legal obligations.
2 88
He concludes that these treaties are still enforceable under international law,
particularly in light of the 1975 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice on the status of the Western Sahara, which confirmed the international
legal effect of agreements between indigenous peoples and clearly recognized
sovereign states. 289 Weissner also notes that the treaties must be interpreted in
accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, which differs sig-
nificantly from U.S. domestic law interpreting treaties with Indian nations, and
means that judicially-created doctrines cannot be invoked to avoid their en-
forcement.
290
Indian nations are best described as internal colonies, for they meet all of
the international criteria for "non-self-governing territories" except the condi-
tion that such territories must be separated from the colonizing power by at
least 30 miles of open sea. 291 This requirement, strongly supported by the U.S.,
287. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 93. Although the United States is not a
party to the treaty, it recognizes the treaty as codifying the customary law of agreements between states
which is binding on the U.S. See Steven C. Nelson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relat-
ing to International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 605 (1971).
288. Wiessner, supra note 65, at 584, 591.
289. Id. at 592; see Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4 (Oct. 16, 1975).
290. Wiessner, supra note 65 at 593-97; see also infra text accompanying notes 254-256. "In ad-
dition, the international law character of these treaties would make their provisions potentially invoca-
ble before international bodies." Id. at 598.
291. The U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., at 66, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (1960), declares, "The
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of funda-
mental human rights .. " While this would appear to apply directly to Indian nations, the United Na-
tions, being a body composed only of states, followed up with Resolution 1541 (XV) which constrained
its application to people separated from colonizing powers by at least thirty miles of open ocean. The
lack of intervening "blue water," however, does not change realities of the relationship. See Roxanne
Dunbar Ortiz, Protection of American Indian Territories in the United States: Applicability of Interna-
tional Law, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 247, 259-60 (Imre
Sutton ed., 1985). See generally WARD CHURCHILL, The Indigenous Peoples of North America: A
Struggle Against Internal Colonialism, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN
RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 15 (1999); WARD CHURCHILL, A Breach of
Trust: The Radioactive Colonization of Native North America, in PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE:
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adds nothing substantive to the definition of a colonized people. It simply in-
sulates settler states which occupy the lands of peoples they have colonized.
Thus, indigenous peoples in the United States should be protected by all of the
provisions for self-determination described above, as well as the Genocide
Convention 292 and the norms articulated with respect to indigenous and colo-
nized peoples in the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Territories and Peoples,293 the International Labour Organization (ILO)'s
Convention on Indigenous Populations, 94 and the Draft Declaration on the
295Rights of Indigenous Peoples developed by the Working Group on Indige-
nous Populations which was organized under the auspices of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee as a result of the efforts of the indigenous International In-
296dian Treaty Council in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Application of this body of international law would mean that Congress
could not simply pass something entitled the "Indian Self-Determination
Act"297 providing for increased access to federal programs while maintaining
its plenary power prerogatives, and wash its hands of the matter. 298 "Self-
determination" by its very nature, cannot be imposed upon a people but must be
defined by them. James Anaya says:
In pressing their demands internationally, indigenous peoples have pointedly un-
dermined the premise of the state as the highest and most liberating form of human
association . . The model that is emerging... sees indigenous peoples as simul-
taneously distinct from yet part of the states within which they live, as well as part
of other units of social and political interaction that might include indigenous fed-
erations or transnational associations. Within this model, self-determination is
achieved.., by the consensual development of context-specific arrangements that
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2002).
292. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). Forty years after the convention was drafted, the U.S.
ratified with two reservations, five understandings, and one declaration, including a reservation against
jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice.
293. See supra notes 281-282.
294. Convention Concerning Populations and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
1989, reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989).
295. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Revised Working Paper Submitted by
the Chairperson/Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26 (1993), available
at http://www.usask.ca/nativelaw/ddir.html. For a history and compilation of related documents, see
SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR RIGHTS: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW
REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS (1998).
296. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 151-79 (1996);
ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIz, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION 29-
72 (1986); JIMMIE DURHAM, A CERTAIN LACK OF COHERENCE: WRITINGS ON ART AND CULTURAL
POLITICS 38-56 (1993); VENNE, supra note 275, at 107-63. See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh, In-
digenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM RTS. J.
33 (1994).
297. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 450 (2000)).
298. See generally Markus B. Heyder, The International Law Commission 's Draft Articles on
State Responsibility: Draft Article 19 and Native American Self-Determination, 32 COL. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (1994).
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uphold for indigenous peoples both spheres of autonomy commensurate with rele-
vant cultural patterns and rights of participation in the political processes of the
states in which they live.
2 9 9
If the United States complied with international law, it would both allow for
real self-determination, and would provide all peoples within its jurisdiction
protections similar to, but more extensive than those provided by the Constitu-
tion. These are embodied in the general provisions for human rights included in
the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 °1 the
302Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights30 3 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 304 and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, 30 5 among other instruments. Put most succinctly, the
incorporation of international law into U.S. jurisprudence is the most promising
way to ensure the end of genocidal and ecocidal policies and practices, the ad-
herence to existing treaties, the return of unceded land, and the implementation
of political self-determination.
306
The integration of international law into U.S. jurisprudence would also
dramatically improve the legal posture of African Americans and other "mi-
norities" who have been treated as Other, but are not officially subject to the
plenary power doctrine, as has been recognized by advocates of racial justice
from Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. DuBois to Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Malcolm X.30 7 In 1947, the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (NAACP) denounced U.S. racial discrimination in a petition to the
United Nations and in 1951, the Civil Rights Congress filed another petition
entitled "We Charge Genocide." The potential impact of international human
299. S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples and International Law Issues, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 96, 98 (1998).
300. U.N. Charter, supra note 274.
301. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 259.
302. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 292.
303. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 266.
304. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 276.
305. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 270.
306. Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-Determination
for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 65, 65 (1992) (noting that because Congress and U.S.
courts have failed to provide legal protection, Indian nations should "turn to international human rights
law for help in securing the right of self-government against federal abrogation"). See generally Steven
Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 217 (1993); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International
Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DuKE
L.J. 660.
307. See Theodore M. Shaw, The Race Convention and Civil Rights in the United States, 3 N.Y.
CrrY L. REV. 19 (1998) (discussing the benefits international law could provide to the struggle for civil
rights in the U.S.). See generally Ruth Gordon, Critical Race Theory and International Law: Conver-
gence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827 (2000); Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective
Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2000); Hope Lewis, Reflections on
"'Blackcrit Theory ": Human Rights, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
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rights law on racial justice in the United States can be seen by considering one
of many possible examples, the United States' systematic use of "law enforce-
ment" to crush political dissent.
In 1975, a lengthy investigation by the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the "Church
Committee") revealed that since the mid-1950s federal intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies had engaged in concerted efforts "to disrupt,... discredit,
or otherwise neutralize" organizations which challenged the social, political or
racial hierarchy.3 °8 The groups targeted included all of the civil rights organi-
zations, from King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference to the Black
Panther Party, the American Indian Movement, the Puerto Rican Young Lords
and others who advocated Puerto Rican independence, and the Chicano Brown
Berets.309 The emergence of leadership of color was perceived as a threat to the
government, and multiracial coalitions were particularly targeted.310 Govern-
ment tactics included intentional dissemination of misleading information about
the groups and their leaders, repeated arrests of activists on false charges,
wrongful convictions and imprisonment, use of infiltrators and agents provo-
cateur to disrupt organizations, orchestration of military and police actions to
erode community support, physical assaults, and outright assassinations.
311
The Church Committee hearings were suspended in 1975, just before testi-
mony was to be heard about attacks on American Indian and Latino organiza-
312tions, and they have never been resumed. Despite the Committee's harsh
condemnation of the agencies' practices as constituting a "record of abuse,"
313
many similar programs continue to be implemented today.3 14 Some who were
wrongfully incarcerated as a result of these programs have been released but
others remain in prison, and no acknowledgment of or redress for these actions
has been extended to the victims or their families. 315 Intraconstitutional re-
308. See FBI memorandum of August 25, 1967 initiating the "Black liberation movement"
COINTELPRO, reproduced in WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS:
DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI's SECRET WAR AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES 92-93 (1990)
[hereinafter COINTELPRO PAPERS]; see also WARD CHURCHILL, "To Disrupt, Discredit and De-
stroy ": The FBI's Secret War against the Black Panther Party, in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION, AND THE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY 78-117 (Kathleen Cleaver & George Katsiaficas eds., 2001); WARD
CHURCHILL AND JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI'S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT (1988) [hereinafter AGENTS];
ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870 TO 1976 (2001).
309. See AGENTS, supra note 308, at 32-62.
310. Id.at37-62.
311. Id.
312. See PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 125-26 (1991); CO1NTELPRO
PAPERS, supra note 308, at 397 n.147.
313. U.S. Senate, Final Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, Bk. II, at 20 (1975).
314. See AGENTS, supra note 308, at 353-81; COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 308, at xiv-xv,
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 308, at xiii.
315. See Human Rights in the U.S.: The Unfinished Story of Political Prisoners/Victims of
COINTELPRO (2001) (from transcript of forum held for the Congressional Black Caucus, Sept. 14,
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sponses to these violations of both the Constitution and international law have
proven ineffective, in large measure because these programs were carried out
by the very agencies charged with upholding the law and the Constitution, with
the specific intent of preventing the expression of political dissent or the im-
plementation of meaningful social change.
3 16
International law, particularly as articulated in the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),3 17 specifically prohibits such conduct
by a government towards its citizens. If American courts would enforce these
treaties, both of which have been ratified by the United States, the abuses
documented by the Church Committee and others could be fully investigated,
legislation implemented to prevent such practices, and victims identified and
compensated to the extent possible. This, in turn, would make the constitutional
guarantees that are supposed to protect those who work for racial and economic
justice actually effective.3"'
Generally, compliance with international law would require adherence to
international standards of civil and political rights, thus opening up the polity to
the possibility of structural change. It would also mean abolishing the de facto
existence of separate systems of law for different groups, 319 and complying
with the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Convention, as well as other
international law concerning the treatment of ethnic, racial, religious, and lin-
guistic minorities. It would require something the United States has fought
since the formation of the United Nations 32-acknowledging that U.S. domes-
tic policies with respect to race are not consistent with international norms and
genuinely participating in international fora such as the 2001 U.N. Conference
on Racism in Durban, South Africa rather than walking out of them, literally or
figuratively.
32 1
2000) (on file with author).
316. See AGENTS, supra note 308. On-going problems of this nature were presented to the ICERD
Committee in 2001. See HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH FUND, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMITTEE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, CONCERNING THE INITIAL REPORT
FROM THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2001) (on file with author).
317. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION, 600 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
318. For a parallel analysis, see Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Back-
yard. Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law-A
Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 71 (2000).
319. Among other things it would mean eliminating the "intent" requirement for discrimination,
compare ICERD art. 2.1(c) (focusing on effect), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (re-
quiring discriminatory intent), and getting to the root of racial disparities in criminal law enforcement.
See generally JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996).
320. See Henkin, supra note 8.
321. On the U.S. walkout from the Durban conference, see Rachel L. Swarns, Rancor and Pow-
ell's Absence Cloud Racism Parley, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, at A3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A metaconstitutional jurisprudence such as I am proposing would acknowl-
edge that American law encompasses both (1) the large body of statutes, com-
mon law, and judicial decisions which fall within the parameters of the Con-
stitution, and (2) the law that is created and enforced by the U.S. government
but has been declared by the Supreme Court to be essentially unconstrained by
the Constitution. If the latter is actually law and not simply the exercise of raw
power, and yet does not incorporate constitutional protections, it seems logical
to recognize it as an area governed by international law. This would preserve
the United States as a "nation of laws"; to do otherwise is to elevate "might
makes right" to the status of judicial doctrine.
As briefly sketched above, this is not simply a matter of logic. Individuals,
communities, and nations have been and continue to be damaged and destroyed
by the government's exercise of plenary power. The United States government
often treats Others in a manner that violates international law. Applying an in-
traconstitutional analysis, the courts have sometimes proscribed such actions,
either by recognizing the Constitution's directive that international law is part
of the supreme law of the land, or by extending constitutional protections to the
Others involved. More often, however, they have developed judicial doctrines
that allow such actions despite their conflict with international law, or have de-
clared the action acceptable because those affected are not protected by the
Constitution. A metaconstitutional jurisprudence would recognize that this is
only part of the legal analysis; even if such actions are deemed "constitutional"
they must also comport with international law. It would develop a comprehen-
sive picture of American law, both intra- and extraconstitutional, and would
recognize the responsibility of the judiciary to ensure that whenever the U.S.
government asserts American jurisdiction, it is lawful-not simply allowed by
the Constitution, but lawful.
Advocating the incorporation of international law into U.S. jurisprudence is
not to suggest that those currently subject to the plenary power doctrine should
not benefit from equal protection under the Constitution. It is, instead, an ar-
gument that expanding intraconstitutional protection is insufficient. For the rea-
sons discussed in Part IV, it may be structurally infeasible to fully constitution-
alize governmental action with respect to immigrants, Indian nations, and
external U.S. colonies. Just as the law of slavery was integral to the Union and
to the Constitution, the existence of a realm in which the government exercises
plenary power may be integral to U.S. law as a whole. If the purpose of the
domestic legal system is to ensure full civil and political rights to those "inside"
the polity while simultaneously maintaining the structures of colonial domina-
tion that ensure the state's control over the land, labor, and resources it desires,
it would be futile to expect that law to protect those it was designed to exclude.
Even where constitutional protection is or could be made available, it will
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not suffice to protect the rights of those currently subject to the exercise of ple-
nary power. Limiting those subject to U.S. jurisdiction to intraconstitutional
remedies violates international law, both because of the domestic doctrines that
"override" international law and because the solution presumes that the United
States has legitimate jurisdiction over these peoples. Further assimilation of
those regarded as Other into the U.S. polity may not be their choice, as illus-
trated by Puerto Rican opposition to statehood and the long history of Indian
resistance to incorporation into the American polity. As Judge Cabranes says:
"Powerlessness is what colonialism is all about. And decolonization in all its
varieties-whether it is national independence, autonomy or free association, or
political integration into the metropolitan state on the basis of equality-is eve-
. ,,322
rywhere supposed to be the antidote to this historical political impotence.
Most importantly, the way in which decolonization occurs must be freely cho-
sen by the colonized; it is not a choice for the colonizing power to make.
In arguing for a jurisprudence that incorporates international law, this arti-
cle leaves two large subject areas virtually untouched. First, I have referred to
law that would prohibit the injustices currently allowed by invocation of the
plenary power doctrine but have not focused on redress or reparation for the
damage already caused. As Karen Parker and Jennifer Chew state: "The right
to redress an international wrong is recognized by scholars as a fundamental
principle of customary law. Recognition of this right clearly pre-dates World
War II, and it has been incorporated into both treaties and international legal
opinions.' 323 Particularly in light of the redress programs that have been insti-
tuted following the horrors of World War II, a considerable body of interna-
tional law is evolving in this field and it too would have to be taken seriously, if
international law were incorporated into U.S. jurisprudence. 324
Second, I have not addressed the use of international fora for the enforce-
ment of international law. The United States's advocacy of the "global rule of
law" has been discredited by its refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the In-
ternational Court of Justice,325 the International Criminal Court, 32 6 the Inter-
322. Cabranes, supra note 101, at 40.
323. Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's World War 11 War Rape Vic-
tims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 497, 524 (1994); see also Jim~nez de Arrchaga, Interna-
tional Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 Rec. des Cours 285-87 (1978), reprinted in HENKIN ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 583 (3d ed. 1993) ("[A] State discharges the respon-
sibility incumbent upon it for breach of an international obligation by making reparation for the injury
caused."). This principle was recognized by the district court in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
505. F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
324. See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HuMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (1997); DINAH
SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1999).
325. See generally Paul W. Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in
Nicaragua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1987).
326. See Lynn Sellers Bickley, US. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword
Mightier Than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 213 (2000).
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American Court of Human Rights, 327 and other international institutions. To the
extent the United States acknowledges international law, it will have to take
these institutions seriously and participate in their development. In the mean-
time, it seems that the best way to enhance the support they receive from the
U.S. government is to get the law they enforce taken seriously in U.S. courts.
Legal changes alone will not solve all of the problems referenced in this ar-
ticle. As Rivera Ramos emphasizes, the Supreme Court's plenary power deci-
sions "are not the ultimate determinants of the reproduction of the colonial
condition. The reproduction of the relationship of subordination that colonial-
ism entails is the resultant of diverse factors that have served to reinforce each
other in a multidimensional process." 328 Nonetheless, restructuring the legal
paradigm within which the United States operates would go a long way toward
reversing this process of reinforcement, for real de-colonization and protection
of fundamental human rights requires a jurisprudence that explicitly incorpo-
rates international law.
327. Because the United States is not a party to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, OEA/ser. L./V/1 1, 23 doc. Rev.2, it is not subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court. The Inter-American Commission, however, can investigate allegations
that the United States is violating its obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American
States or the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. See generally THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL & DINAH SHELTON, PROTECTING HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 1995).
328. Rivera Ramos, supra note 26, at 311.
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